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Abstract: This dissertation explored the efficacy of the new Basel III banking standards in 
SACU, grounded on the conjecture that they are not reflective of economies of SACU, but are 
merely an intensification of Basel II, rather than a substantial break with it. Firstly, loans 
and assets were tested for causality, since Basel III believes growth in these variables led to 
securitization. The leverage ratio has been introduced in Basel III as an anti-cyclical buffer. 
The OLS technique was employed to test for its significance in determining growth in bank 
assets. SACU feels the impact of debt, with credit is marginally treated in Basel III and is not 
introspective of the realities of its economies. ANOVA tests using debt, credit and GDP were 
done to determine a better method of addressing cyclicality. The leverage ratio was 
insignificant in Namibia, with debt and credit having momentous impacts on GDP in SACU.  
 
Key terms: Basel standards, leverage ratio, Granger Causality, Minimum Capital 
Requirements, Cyclical buffer, Liquidity Requirements, Analysis of Variance.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Basel accords came into existence with a view to addressing crises emanating from banking 
operations. The growth of securitization led to the subprime crisis of 2009, paving the 
dermis of Basel II (Underhill, Blom and Mugge, 2010:13).  Basel III is awaiting 
implementation from beginning 2015, and it is hoped that it will lead to long term stability 
of the financial system (Federal Reserve Bank, 2011:27). Rating Agent Standard & Poor 
(2010:3) is of the opinion that the effectiveness of the Basel III proposals could be 
jeopardized by the implementation of a leverage ratio which is not well calibrated. Others 
like Murinde (2011:12) say central banks of SACU and Africa were never actively involved 
in the architecture of Basel III. He suggests a review of the recommendations in order to 
decide on the key aspects to be incorporated in their bank regulatory frameworks. 
     SACU membership comprise of South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
This study will use sixteen banks from SACU, namely: Barclays, FNB and Stanbic of 
Botswana; ABSA, FNB, Nedbank and Standard bank of South Africa; Standard bank, FNB, 
and Nedbank of Namibia; Standard bank, Absa and FNB of Swaziland and Standard bank, 
FNB and Nedbank of Lesotho. South Africa will be represented by four banks in this study 
to reflect the size of its economy.  
    Since Basel III standards are biased towards American and European banks, this study 
will use SACU financial institutions to examine the errors committed by financial 
institutions generally. These errors revolve around the manner in which loans were 
generated as assets grew; differences in the use and interpretation of the leverage ratio and 
errors committed from credit and debt acquisition which negatively impacted on GDP.  The 
researcher in the study finds it important to investigate the strength of these standards, as 
some researchers are of the opinion that the proposed capital reserve requirements are 
low (Ponte, Gibbon and Vestergaard, 2011:66). SACU feels the credit to GDP guide for 
activating the Basel III counter cyclical buffer is too mechanistic and not reflective of the 
realities of the economies of its member countries (FSB1, 2012:15).  
 
 
                                               
1
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         There is strong evidence that the accord has relegated the concern with counter 
cyclicality to margins and that the latest prescriptions fail to relate risk taking with risk 
absorption (Ponte, et. al 2011:70). Moreover, there is strong consensus that the 
calibrations used in the calculation of the liquidity standards do not correctly capture SACU 
countries’ financial market structures (Murinde, 2011:12).  
       In view of the findings of other related researches such as Blinder (2010:1), Ponte, et.al 
(2011:67), and others across the globe, the latest Basel III standards suffer from a range of 
conceptual and methodological limitations. As such this study intends to test the 
effectiveness of these standards and to propose better banking standards in the form of 
Basel IV.  
      In view of the above, this study hypothesizes that: The Basel III Accord is essentially, an 
intensification of Basel II rather than a substantial break with it. This does not augur well 
for the financial stability of the world economy. This study will be confined to the major 
banks in SACU, sampled using a stratified random sampling technique. This study will be 
empirical and will use quantitative methods and the deductive approach. The data will be 
collected from secondary sources and analysed using Time Series data. Tests will be done 
by EVIEWS 7 software package and results will be presented in tables.  
    When the governors of the world’s major central banks and bank supervisory agencies 
met on September 12, 2010 to give approval of the Basel III accord, this was met with 
jubilation that the panacea to problems affecting the banking industry had been found. 
Besides, it just took eighteen months for twenty seven countries; each with its own 
disparate views and parochial interests to reach an agreement, barely a few months after 
the financial crisis had passed.  
         There is consensus amongst researchers that the agreed increase in capital reserve 
requirements is far from sufficient, and that the provision of the counter cyclicality is 
marginal, just an addendum and not at the centre of capital reserve requirements. Concerns 
exist that the monitoring and governing of credit growth and capital market inflation are 
also relegated to the margins of the new accord, regardless of the centrality of such efforts 
to macro prudential financial regulation. There is no effort to adopt  a differentiated 
approach to financial regulation, ensuring different kinds of financial institutions take the 
types of risk that they are most capable of absorbing. 
11 
 
     FSB (2012:15) claims SACU is concerned with the complexity of Basel III rules and the 
negative effect they may pose on the development and functioning of capital markets 
within its jurisdiction and on certain types of banking activities, such as trade finance.  In a 
study by Tobias and Hyuan (2008:1), bank leverage was found to be the main cause of 
financial crises. This study will test the viability of the leverage ratio, the impact of debt and 
credit on GDP in SACU. Major banks in SACU such as Barclays, FNB and Stanbic of 
Botswana; Absa, FNB, Nedbank and Standard Bank of South Africa; Standard Bank, FNB 
and Nedbank of Namibia; Standard Bank, Absa and FNB of Swaziland and Standard Bank, 
FNB and Nedbank of Lesotho will be used in this study. This amounts to a total of sixteen 
banks.         
     The Basel Committee mandates bank managers to use their discretion, depending on the 
bank’s circumstances in relation to other banks. It is the opinion of this study that the 
discretionary approach weakens the efficacy of the standards to adequately address 
cyclicality, since individual decisions are susceptible to errors. Reserves on capital 
requirements are viewed as patently inadequate as they are set at 3% level.  Researchers 
on Basel standards foresee even European and American banks failing to meet these capital 
requirements.    
1.1 The Leverage Ratio 
       A leverage ratio is an expression of the total value of a bank’s assets, relative to its 
equity capital. Differing opinions on the viability of the leverage ratio in stemming the 
financial crisis exist today amongst financial experts. KPMG2 (2012:12) believes the 
leverage ratio will act as a non risk sensitive backstop measure. The institution claims the 
cause of the financial crisis was the uncontrolled piling of leverage in both the European 
and American banking systems. Therefore, the leverage ratio was believed to be the 
panacea in curtailing financial crisis in the whole world, while it failed to do so in the US, 
where it already existed. Tobias and Hyuan (2008:1) subscribed to this idea; they believed 
bank leverage is high during a boom and low during recessions. For example, the Lehman 
Brothers had an excessively high leverage which led to a higher sensitivity of its balance 
sheet to trading, resulting in its closure (Moorad, 2011:266).       
                                               
2
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      Howell (2010: 23) stated that, the fact that the financial crisis originated and had its 
greatest impact in the US albeit the presence of the leverage ratio for banks is evidence that 
a leverage ratio is unlikely to be a panacea per se. Denmark’s largest bank, Danske, says the 
leverage ratio would be unable to capture the low risk of its large mortgage portfolio 
(Shearman and Sterling, 2011:4).  The Association of German Banks has called for its 
elimination, claiming it compels banks to scale down lending and slacken economic 
recovery (Ponte, et al 2011:92). SACU has expressed concern about aspects of the leverage 
ratio and measures to reduce pro cyclicality that may impact domestic credit and output 
growth (FSB, 2012:14).   
      To date, only three countries are using the ratio (USA, Canada and Switzerland). To 
implement a consistent leverage ratio across the globe requires a coordinated effort from 
regulators. In the three countries where it is in current use, variations in calculations of the 
leverage ratio exist. This weakens the value of the measure (Standard & Poor, 2010:4). 
Disclosures about the components necessary in calculating the leverage ratio should make 
the measure more valuable. This view is shared by Rustom, et.al (2010:26) who advocate 
for an integrated approach containing all the other proposals, including those regarding the 
framework for liquidity risk. 
     Furthermore, the proposal is silent on how the leverage ratio would interact with the 
capital weighting approach and these issues have been deferred to be discussed in the near 
future with banks across diverse jurisdictions with very different banking structures. 
Blundell, Wignal and Atkinson (2010:16) believe part of the reason for the postponement is 
that the risk weighting and the leverage ratio are not compatible. 
 1.2 Counter Cyclical Measures 
   Cyclicality refers to variations in GDP in an economy over time. Counter cyclicality 
measures are systems used by banks to avoid cyclicality.  A number of these measures have 
been proposed by researchers. Ponte, et. al (2011:65) supposed counter cyclical measures 
are useful when provisioning of bank credit is growing faster relative to the economy itself. 
The use of the leverage ratio is one way of addressing cyclicality. Capital buffers set 
between 0 to 2.5% of risk weighted assets by national authorities are also proposed. 
Improvising and diversifying market management models through tailoring them to 
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individual firm’s characteristics and business lines is another method (Andritzky, et. al, 
2009:4). 
     Different methods to counter cyclicality have been recommended. Firstly, the 
discretionary approach, and secondly the formula-based approach. The discretionary 
system allows bank regulators to judge the right level of required capital ratios in light of 
the macroeconomic cycle.  The formula-driven approach proposes that the level of capital 
depends on a predetermined metric as growth of the balance sheet. This study believes that 
the effectiveness in countering cyclicality relies heavily on the use of tools of moving 
averages, extrapolation and forecasting which are elementary in timing a business cycle. 
Griffith, Jones and Ocampo, (2009:7) confirm that, counter cyclical regulation has received 
wider recognition in global reports including those of the UK and US Treasuries. 
     In Switzerland, counter-cyclical regulation identifies between minimum capital 
adequacies requirements during recession periods and doubling them during boom times. 
However, countries differ in characteristics; therefore, this criterion may not yield similar 
results in all countries. Empirical evidence show that credit precedes business cycles, 
therefore measures that incorporate credit may not be a good measure for the release of 
the buffer (Afroditi, 2011:3).Forward-looking dynamic provisioning is being used in Spain, 
Peru and Columbia as another method. It requires banks to account for future credit losses 
when calculating their pre-tax incomes. 
    Of the two methods, that is, the discretionary and rule based, Rustom, et. al (2010:29) 
suggested for the use of a combination of discretion and formula as a way of addressing 
cyclicality.  This study does not subscribe to the use of the discretionary method as this 
largely depends on the expertise of bank management. This study does not find this 
approach convincing, as the subprime crisis was caused by the discretion of bank 
management, manipulating the loopholes in the Basel II standards in securitizing debt 
obligations. As a result, management committed a lot of errors in this regard.  
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1.3 Minimum liquidity measures 
       Minimum liquidity measures are ways used by a bank to maintain sufficient funds to 
meet its commitments when they fall due. It entails matching the maturity of assets and 
liabilities daily and coping with short term pressures that may arise in the process of assets 
being fully funded. The US Treasury report of 2009 argues that, excessive funding of long 
term assets with short term debt by a bank can contribute to its failure (Griffith, et.al 
2009:15). 
       The Subprime crisis of 2008 was a wakeup call on the need for banks to always monitor 
liquidity levels. Basel III seeks to introduce internationally harmonized minimum liquidity 
requirements: Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), which focuses on short term liquidity and 
the Net Stable Funding Ratio. Monetarists are of the opinion that the introduction of the 
liquidity standards will help bring to an end the recurrence of a liquidity crunch of the size 
witnessed in the recent crisis (Delahaye, 2011:11). 
       No limit is set for the NSFR and bank supervisors are expected to use their discretion 
depending on the bank’s circumstances in relation to that of other banks. Moorad 
(2011:274) believes this measure should not be seen as a metric on which one could set a 
‘one size fits all’ limit; but to see it as part of a set of other metrics before determining 
regulatory compliance.  
1.4 Capital Reserve Requirements 
     Capital reserve requirements refer to the amount of capital a bank holds to provide a 
cushion for the transactions that it enters into. It is the difference between the assets and 
liabilities on its balance sheet. Basel II has three weaknesses relative to Basel I. These are, 
reduced capital requirements; assigning the role of risk assessments to credit rating 
agencies such as Moody and Standard & Poor and allowing banks to use their own internal 
models to measure risk. This presents a serious risk-weighting (denominator) problem. 
Banks exploited this loophole and used structured investment vehicles to bypass capital 
requirements by shifting assets off balance sheet. Basel III intends to address this anomaly. 
Blinder, (2010:1) agreed to this, when stating that, ‘Basel III places the focus squarely 
where it belongs, on common equity, which is real capital, when it calls for capital 
requirements to be raised’. 
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      Basel III has resurrected the leverage ratio with no risk weighting, but the capital 
requirement is only 3%, a level the Lehman Brothers had. In a Latin American research 
study by Diaz, Olivero and Powell (2011:14), it was concluded that Basel III’s anti cyclical 
rules on the financial accelerator effect of fixed bank capital requirements will have little 
impact depending on the overall levels of capital. They therefore advocate for a much 
aggressive rule than the one contemplated in Basel III.  
1.5 Motivation of study 
      Economies of SACU have not been spared from the depressing effects of the business 
cycles caused by financial markets failure. As part of the global village SACU, financial 
institutions have been implementing an assortment of changes to banking standards, as 
prescribed by the different Basel accords. In spite of these changes bank failure with 
devastating effects on SACU economies continue to exist.  
     Monetary authorities within SACU are reluctant to implement some of the Basel 
requirements because they believe they negatively affect their growth targets. SACU 
members argue the banking standards are not home grown because they lack their input 
and fail to capture the liberation history of their economies. They argue the banking 
standards are tailor-made to suit European and American economies. 
     Each time a bank failure occurs in these economies, the blame is placed on the 
complexity of the Basel banking standards. The importance of the leverage ratio introduced 
in Basel III is not understood.  The new capital requirements are deemed to be anti growth.  
Measures that are prescribed to counter cyclicality, such as the creation of an excess capital 
buffer for banks, the use of discretion by banking supervisors and the rule based 
approaches, are deemed not reflective of the realities of the economies of SACU members. 
Consequently, the problem questions for this study are: 
                 * To what extent is the leverage ratio significant to economies of SACU?  
* Is the growth in loans preceded by growth in assets within the customs union?  
* To what extend is debt and credit impacting negatively on GDP? 
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1.6 Objectives of study         
The aim of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of the LR on bank assets in the SACU 
area.   The technique of ‘Granger causality’ will be used to observe the presence of causality 
between bank assets and loans. Time series data on bank loans and assets from 2000 to 
2013 will be sampled per panel and used. Assets and loans will be used because some 
researchers argue that growth in assets led to increased leveraging by banks.  
     The OLS technique will then test for the significance of the leverage ratio in determining 
the level of bank assets. The test will involve a regression of the leverage ratio on assets for 
the period under study.  Panel data analysis will also be employed in this study. Time series 
data analysis on the efficacy of the leverage ratio will be conducted. The trend in the series 
will be identified by calculating the correlations at different time periods. This will enable 
this study to identify whether the leverage ratio is consistent in providing protection to 
banks over a long period. Leedy and Ormrod (2010:183) advocates for the suitability of 
time series data analysis in identifying a particular pattern in a variable over a certain 
period. In that case, correlation analysis is proposed to identify any patterns inherent in the 
entities’ assets over time.    
       Finally, a two way ANOVA on the impact of credit and debt on GDP will be carried out. 
SACU believes the credit to the GDP guide for activating the Basel III banking counter 
cyclical buffer is too mechanistic because it’s based on assumption that countries are 
identical and fails to capture the realities of its member economies. This study will use debt 
and credit to test for the amount of their impact on GDP in SACU. Weiers,(2011:442) 
believes, a two- way analysis of variance, simultaneously examines the effect of credit and 
debt on GDP, along with the effects of interactions between the different levels of these 
three factors.  
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1.7 Hypothesis          
      This study will hypothesize that: 
a) The leverage ratio is not significant enough to determine bank assets level, hence cannot 
insulate banks from financial crisis that arise in financial markets, otherwise, the leverage 
ratio is significant enough to determine bank assets level and can insulate banks from 
financial crisis that arise in financial markets.  
b) Furthermore, this study will hypothesize that debt and credit have no bearing on GDP.  
The null and alternative hypotheses for the second hypothesis will be expressed in terms of 
the main effects, that is, debt and credit and interaction effects (a combination of these 
factors), otherwise debt and credit have a bearing on GDP. 
1.8 Outline of Chapters 
    In Chapter 2, developments of the various Basel banking standards will be discussed and   
an outline of the proposals contained in the new Basel III banking standards will conclude 
the chapter.  
    Chapter 3 will provide a literature review on the previous studies done on Basel banking 
standards.  
    Chapter 4 outlines with the methodology of this study. Firstly, the format of data is 
outlined, followed by the testing of the hypotheses. 
    Chapter 5 will analyse the findings from the estimations.  Findings from causality will be 
discussed first, followed by findings from OLS estimations on the significance of the 
leverage ratio on bank assets. Lastly, the chapter will explain the impact of debt and credit 
on GDP using the technique of ANOVA.  
     Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter, giving the implications of the findings of this study 
and providing some recommendations on further research.   
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  CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENTS OF THE BASEL BANKING STANDARDS 
      Non alignment of regulations in international banking hampered transactions in 
financial markets. The lack of an internationally harmonised banking framework implied 
that it remained difficult to supervise the flows of funds across nations. Variation in bank 
capitalisation made comparison and implementation of banking regulations difficult, 
globally.  The rise in bank securitization exacerbated the need for an international banking 
framework to protect public funds and the world economies in general. This chapter will be 
divided into two subsections. Sub-section 2.1 will provide a brief overview leading to the 
developments of the Basel banking standards with a discussion on those aspects that were 
wrongly and rightly done. Expectations and criticism levelled against Basel III will also be 
alluded to in subsection 2.2. 
2.1 Background 
    International cooperation in financial regulation resulted from the collapse of two large 
international banks in 1974, namely Bankhause Herstatt, an insolvent institution in 
Cologne in West German; and Franklin National Bank of the United States of America. 
Bankhause Herstatt was a very small bank that had foreign exchange dealings with banks 
in other countries. It occurred that due to time differentials, the payments of the foreign 
exchange dealings had not been sent, and by the time the bank closed, the inflow of these 
funds was blocked, causing massive losses at many other banks of the globe (Jackson, et. al 
1999:1). 
       As Bankhause Herstatt was crumpling, the financial authorities in United States were 
battling to avert the collapse of Franklin National Bank caused by shortage of liquidity since 
it also had a disproportionately large position in international currency markets.  
Bankhause Herstatt was the first to collapse and Franklin National Bank followed. Privy of 
the consequences posed by the demise of the Franklin National Bank, the monetary 
authorities of the United States had no option, but to sell it. After the collapse of the above 
named banks came the 1983 Mexican debt obligations default to the U.S banks which 
caused exposure on the banks’ balance sheets. This culminated in the U.S congress ordering 
regulators in the country to compel banks to make improvements on their capitalization.  
Banks did not welcome the decision as higher capitalization placed them at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to their trading partners in Japan.  
19 
 
     The Japanese banks by then were the world’s largest, lending at low interest rates due to 
regulators in that country allowing them to lend while maintaining little capital on hand.  
Jackson, et.al (1999:2) observed that where banks were required to maintain equity 
cushions exceeding what they had otherwise chosen it was natural for banks to view 
capital standards as a form of regulatory taxation.                                                   
     The collapse of Franklin National Bank and Bankhause Herstatt Bank and the Mexican 
debt crises made it apparent that international banking activities lacked proper 
supervision. There was a need to create a framework that would harmonize banking 
standards.  There was a call for international regulations to impose the same standards on 
all global banks.  The U.S congress empathized with the bankers’ concerns and made 
progress towards bringing about international convergence on the financial policy 
(Disyatat, 2008:50). This exercise was a complicated one because each country had its own 
standards on the amount of capital that banks needed and how that capital was measured.  
Therefore, no country was keen to impose heavier costs on its own financial sector.  
     Realizing international backtracking on the need for internationally harmonized banking 
standards, Britain and the U.S signed a bilateral accord on bank capital rules in 1986.  Wary 
that the move by the U.S and Britain would have deleterious effects on its undercapitalized 
banks, Japan was forced to join them and the three countries adopted a single negotiating 
position in Basel. These developments made other countries from the G-10 (Canada, 
France, German, Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy and Sweden including the monetary 
authorities of Netherlands and Luxembourg to discard their stance and subjected 
themselves to common banking standards. This gave birth to the introduction of Basel 
accord I of 1988, whose proposals were to be enforced by the Basel Committee on Banking 
and Supervisory Standards (Jackson, et.al. 1999:5).   
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       The Basel Committee was mandated to examine the complexity of the modern banking 
system and to provide parameters for appropriate supervision. The committee focused on 
effective supervision of international banking operations and proposals aimed at 
harmonizing various national capital adequacy regulations. A supervisory framework 
premised on a common standard of risk assessment was devised. It required all 
international banks to maintain a certain minimum fixed relation between their capital and 
assets. It focused on credit risk by defining capital requirements by the function of a bank’s 
on – and off balance sheet positions. Banks were also required to hold a backing for 
weighted assets of no less than 8% of total capital and at least 4% of tier 1 or core capital.  
         Furthermore, the first step in defining the capital requirement was to determine what 
would be considered as capital. The committee recognized two classes of capital by the 
function of its quality: that is, Tier 1 and Tier 2.   Goodwill had to be deducted from Tier 1 
capital and investments in subsidiaries had to be deducted from total capital base. Goodwill 
was subtracted because it was considered an element whose valuation was very subjective 
and fluctuating with a generally low value in the case of the liquidation of a bank. The 
investments in subsidiaries that were not consolidated were also deducted to avoid several 
entities using the same capital resource (Levison, 2010:3).    
       The Basel Committee was divided on the question of deduction of all banks’ holdings of 
capital issued by other banks to prevent the ‘’ double-gearing’’ effect. Double gearing effect 
is for instance, when bank A invests in the assets of bank B while bank B simultaneously 
invests in the capital of bank A and this artificially increases the equity. The committee did 
not retain the deduction, but it has since been applied in several countries by national 
supervisors. 
      Balance sheet amounts were weighted to reflect the assumed risk level. For example 
cash; claims on OECD3 central governments and claims on other central governments if 
they were determinate and funded in the national currency (to avoid country transfer risk) 
were given a zero rating.  Claims on OECD banks and on banks outside OECD with residual 
maturity less than one year and claims on public sector entities of OECD countries received 
a weighting of twenty.  Mortgage loans had a weighting of fifty.  Claims on corporate, claims 
                                               
3
 OECD, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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on banks and claims outside OECD with a maturity greater than one year, fixed assets and 
all other assets were allocated a 100 % rating.  
     The 1988 accord was the first ever international agreement designed to smoothen the 
risk of a banking crisis. The motive in implementing the banking regulation was to control 
bank activities as originators of credit by encouraging them to improve their capital 
positions. The argument was that the central bank actions caused recessions. For instance, 
when the monetary authorities pursued expansionary monetary policy, they bought 
securities from commercial banks. This increased the reserve holdings for the commercial 
banks and permitted them to accept more deposits which gave them leverage to issue out 
more loans thus expanding the supply of money (Jackson, et. al. 1999:4). 
       Advocates for the Basel rules argued that these rules were crafted to define a minimum 
capital level; but did not preclude national supervisors from implementing stronger 
requirements.  The main principle of insolvency rule was brought in to assign a weight that 
was a function of their estimated risk level to both on-balance sheet items and to acquire a 
capital level equivalent to 80% of those weighted assets. 
     The capital ratio was commended for differentiating assets by function of their assumed 
risk and also for incorporating requirements for off-balance sheet items that had grown 
significantly in the 1980s, with the development of derivative instruments. However, the 
Basel committee lacked supervisory authority and its conclusions did not have legal force 
(Disyatat, 2008:56). It only acted as an advisory body whose aim was to provide 
recommendations for concordats and accords, than laws per se and encouraging 
harmonization of member countries’ regulatory standards, this was because of country 
sovereignty.  
     The good aspects of the 1988 accord included the creation of a worldwide benchmark 
for banking regulations. Originally, the accord had been designed to cater for 
internationally active banks of the G-10 countries, but to date Basel standards stand as a 
beacon of inspiration for banking regulation in more than 100 countries and are often 
imposed on national banks as well. International banks are now faced with a uniform set of 
rules which eliminated the need to discuss with each national regulator what the correct 
capital level should have been for conducting the same business in many different 
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countries. It should be noted that banks from different countries competing on the same 
markets now have equivalent regulatory capital requirements. 
     Furthermore, The introduction of different assets, risk-weights for different assets 
classes, although this did not show completely the true risks of banks credit portfolios, it 
was a clear improvement on previous regulatory ratios that were used in some countries, 
such as equity, assets or deposits ratios. This was an improvement compared to the 
situation before 1988.      
    However, Blinder, (2010:1), argues that a cause for concern was that the Basel 
Committee did not consult widely with the entire global financial institutions when setting 
minimum capital levels. There was growing perception that the new capital requirements 
introduced in 1988 fuelled banks to hold higher capital ratios. Brondt and Prast (1999:25) 
in a study, reported an increase of about 2% points from 9% to 11% in a selected group of 
G-10 countries (the UK, US, Italy, France, Germany and the Netherlands) in the years 1990 
and 1997.  Peura and Jokivuolle (2003:5) observed that the average capital ratios for G-10 
banks in 2001 stood at 11.2% (11.9% in the U.S, with 10.8% in Europe).  
     Meanwhile, Jablecki (2009:6) believed that the reason for the increase in capital ratio 
was as a result of competitive challenges such as securitization rather than new 
regulations. His argument was plausible because capital ratios had increased more than 
would seem necessary to comply with new regulations. Even econometrics studies failed to 
provide clarity on causation.  An analysis of the banking pattern from studies concluded 
that poorly capitalized banks tended to boost their capital ratios to a larger magnitude than 
better capitalized ones; this was achieved through increasing their ratios of capital to risk-
weighted assets (RWA).                                                                             
     The increases in capital ratios paved way for non-compliance by banks contravening the 
principle of financial prudence. Capital arbitraging was on the increase. This capital 
arbitraging practice involved a restructuring process of the financial institution’s portfolio 
to reflect a position of the same or higher risk, hence justifying low capital requirement. 
Merton (1995:12) claimed that when capital was not directly matched with a wide range of 
assets weighted by risk, such circumventing banking practices were likely to perpetuate 
into the future.  Capital arbitraging was manipulated when banks increased their capital 
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through gains trading; this was only feasible in the short run and in the long run the only 
option was to securitize. This helped to lessen the banks’ measures of risk. 
      Levinson, (2010:4) pointed out that although securitization had gained prominence; it 
remained difficult to estimate the full scope of securitization because not all financial 
institutions were willing to disclose adequate information. Ergungor (2003:24) on the 
other hand maintained that it was the imposition of the new capital requirements and 
regulations that constrained asset growth that led to securitization.  The other problem 
was its ‘’one size fits all’’ approach whose requirements were virtually the same whatever 
the risk level of sophistication and activity of the bank.  The 8% capital ratio was an 
arbitrary measure not based on explicit solvency targets. Some scholars alluded to the fact 
that the accord did not recognize diversification. Credit risk requirements were only 
additive while diversification through granting loans to various sectors and regions was 
not recognized.  
       Therefore, as a result of these flaws, among others, the Basel Committee was compelled 
to review the 1988 accord culminating into the Basel II accord in 2004. The Basel II accord 
was successful in increasing sensitivity of capital requirements to risk levels; it also 
introduced regulatory capital needs for operational risk and brought flexibility to the 
accord by having several options left to the discretion of the national regulators. Basel II 
accord increased power of the national regulators, as expected under pillar I to evaluate a 
bank’s capital adequacy considering its specific risk profile.  However, it was silent on the 
form of operational risk; especially the type of losses to consider given that some losses 
would be estimated immediately because their values were not known but others were 
unpredictable. 
    Furthermore, it did not clearly provide clarity on how to classify operational risk, that is, 
which type of operational risk should regulation have considered? If operational risk was 
to be charged to pillar I, then its definition and the diverse statistical properties of its 
components would have been ascertained. Danielsson, et.al (2001:13) were of the view 
that, any losses accruing due to operational risk should have  been directly charged to 
equity holders, management and bondholders of a particular institution since they did not 
spread to other institutions. They differed in opinion with the inclusion of operational risk 
in pillar I. They saw it as premature from a methodological perspective, because 
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operational risk was only intended to provide a cumulative add-on factor to the capital 
charge that may have fallen as a result of increased use of Internal Rating Based (IRB)-
calculated market and credit risk charges. 
     Some scholars believed that operational risk might have acted as an anti-competitive tax 
on banks to the benefit of other non-regulated financial intermediaries. It  was assumed 
that such a levy distorted the level playing field of banks versus other non-regulated 
financial institutions and created incentives for consolidation in banking sector as well as 
non – bank spin offs of many bank activities.  Blundell, et.al (2010:4) were against the risk 
weighting formulas in Basel II capital regulations because they were based on a specific 
mathematical model which was subject to a constraint that it be portfolio invariant. This 
meant that the capital required to back loans was dependent only on the risk of that loan 
and not on the portfolio to which it was added.  
          However, a problem arose where the formula failed to capture the significance of 
diversification as on portfolio risk. The effect of the model was to raise linearly the 
minimum capital requirement related to the loan type as a result of credit risk with the 
holding of that asset type regardless of the magnitude of the exposure.  Basel II risk 
weighting approach promoted portfolio concentrations in low weighted assets like 
government bonds, mortgages and lending between banks. This provided an opportunity 
to economize on capital and expand business into lower-weighted avenues.  
     This was more evident during the time for the credit default swaps (CDS) market. It was 
impossible to suffer from a credit deficit like in other markets before the CDS. This was 
because credit markets were not complete and the CDS contracts manipulated this 
weakness and created the potential for complete markets in credit. When banks swapped 
risk with derivatives the ideology of capital weights was affected because banks were able 
to economize on capital without having to trade as much on the underlying securities on 
primary markets (favouring assets with low risk weights).  
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      Basel II promoted extensive use of Value-at-Risk (VaR) modelling in its advanced 
approaches to calculating capital charges for market, credit and operational risk under 
pillar I. VaR risk models had a serious weakness in that they assumed elliptically 
distributed returns. Current data reveal that the distribution of credit, market and 
operational risks are heavy-tailed, especially operational risk, so that estimates beyond 
VaR become significant. 
     Danielsson, (2000:9) was of the opinion that VaR models were important because they 
provided a point estimate of the loss distribution, a view not shared by other scholars who 
felt simple VaR estimates did not give any important information on the shape of the loss 
function in the tail when the risk distribution was characterized by non-normal tails.  It was 
suggested that VaR regulation relied only on the estimate of a particular quintile opening a 
loop hole for legitimate actions by banks that were susceptible to the proposal. Now that 
the distribution of risk did not matter, a bank would not legitimately shift risk away from 
the quintile that mattered for the calculation of capital charges to the tail through the use of 
options to give an example. 
      Greenlaw, et.al (2008:72) in a US study, observed that approximately 49% of the 
subprime securitization exposures came from U.S’s leveraged sector alone. If foreign 
investment banks and hedge funds were to be added, the extent of the potential subprime 
related losses concentrated in the leveraged sector will rise by two-thirds.  
      Furthermore, leverage ratios relying on current market values tended to be high in good 
times and low in bad times. As such, capital regulations were pro-cyclical because 
judgments tended to under estimate risks in both good and bad times. Therefore, where 
assets failed to capture future cash flows accurately pro-cyclicality would occur. This was 
because banks’ risk measurements were done at a specific point in time and not over the 
entire cycle. It is clear that counter party credit policies were usually easy in good and 
tough in bad ones. Profit recognition and compensation schemes promoted short term risk 
taking but they were not adjusted for risk over the business cycle. There was a need to use 
measurement risks that were holistic for the entire business cycle.   
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     Jablecki, (2008:6)was of the idea that the IRB approach of the Basel II framework 
actually institutionalized this pro-cyclicality by making banks responsible for estimating 
Probability of Default (PD), Loss Given Default (LGD) and Exposure at Default (EAD) which 
were a function of the cycle and were led by stock market, assets values and other financial 
variables. This made it difficult for commercial banks to forecast future asset prices and 
future volatility events. Therefore, the simplified system in Basel II did not change anything 
as was the case with Basel I. Of concern was that the external ratings based approach still 
used credit ratings which were famously pro-cyclical. The riskiness of assets varied over 
the business cycle. Risk assessments, whether based on credit rating agencies’ assessments 
or internal ratings, revealed this pro-cyclicality, especially in the case of internal ratings 
which do not attempt to assess risk through the cycle. 
      This pro-cyclicality in ratings created an identical pro-cyclicality in capital charges 
causing banks to hold less capital, if not, excessively lending at the cusp of a cycle. 
Alternatively, they held capital in excess or under lent during a recession when 
microeconomic stabilization required an increase in lending. As a result, regulation did not 
only render bank crises more likely, but also destabilized the economy as a whole by 
inflating fluctuations.                                            
        Basel II requirements were not clear and had inconsistent definitions of capital. 
Regulatory adjustments for goodwill were not mandated to apply to common equity but 
were applied to Tier 1, or to a combination of Tier 1 and Tier 2.  Additionally, these 
regulatory adjustments were not applied uniformly across jurisdictions clearing the way 
for regulatory arbitrage. Failure by the Basel accords to compel banks to provide clear and 
consistent data about their capital levels was another area where they have failed.  
       A consideration of Pillar II showed that the accord was not cautious about the high 
degree of inflexibility.  In a different view, Danielsson, et.al (2001:14) believed that a high 
degree of flexibility risks counteracted the objectives of ensuring a level playing field. Their 
opinion was that flexibility brought the danger that a regulator used his own discretion to 
lower capital ratios for the bank under his control in order to give it a competitive edge. 
Alternatively, he opted for minimum ratios, prescribed under pillar I, when prudence 
suggested higher capital charges.   
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        These possibilities were significant given the differentials in enforcement of the accord 
within Europe. Britain took a more flexible approach than some continental regulators 
while in the US relaxed capital adequacy ratios were ruled out by legislation. This justified 
the need for a mechanism that ensured that pillar II was implemented uniformly across 
countries and ensured that such quality assessments were done under the auspices   were 
consistent across regulators.  When such flexibility was absent as in the U.S, regulation 
created a knee-jerk reaction that may have aggravated any crisis. 
        A close scrutiny of Pillar III showed that the Basel accords failed the financial system by 
basing capital requirements on the mistaken risk assessments. It instructed national 
regulators to determine the amount of capital a bank would hold basing on the risk of its 
own business. Holding capital was costly and represented money that could not be lent at a 
profit. The capital requirement of pillar III inevitably encouraged banks to aggressively 
pursue activities for which little capital was required. For instance, regulators adhering to 
Basel II rules required banks to hold less capital against home mortgages than against loans 
to large companies.  Lending to large companies was considered riskier. As such, when 
local housing prices collapsed in 2007 banks in many countries had too little capital to 
offset losses on mortgages causing bank runs by borrowers.                                                                       
       In addition, under Basel II loans by foreign banks to Icelandic banks required less 
capital than loans to highly rated multinational corporations because the Icelandic 
government had a strong credit rating. When the crises of 2007 gained momentum, all 
major banks in Iceland collapsed. Levison, (2010:4) believed Basel capital requirements 
destabilized the financial system by giving banks   an incentive to remove loans from their 
books by securitizing them rather than setting aside more capital to back them.  
       Basel II rules allowed large banks to calculate their own capital requirements based on 
their own internal risk models. These proprietary mathematical models performed 
disastrously in 2007 and 2008. They failed to shield the banks from large losses due to the 
collapse of the housing market prices and the global economic down turn. One therefore 
questions the wisdom of letting banks model their own capital requirements.  The creation 
of uniform international definition of ‘capital’ has made the banking system less safe. Well 
before Basel came into existence, some countries had stringent definitions that required 
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banks to hold large capital amounts of equity whilst others had definitions that were more 
lenient on capital requirements.  
      Another weakness on capital requirements was that Basel II rules required banks to 
meet part of their capital requirements with special bond like securities. The implication 
was that should a bank become distressed it would not stop paying interest on Tier 2 
securities or convert them into equity even as the bank operated normally and serviced its 
other bonds. More often, bank regulators treated the owners of Tier 2 securities the same 
way they treated other creditors. They were protected against default. Tier 2 securities 
never performed their intended role as a cushion against the bank’s capital losses.  
2.2 Proposed Basel III Banking Standards 
     The subprime crises of 2008 exposed the flaws in Basel II and led to the introduction of a 
near final version of new bank capital and liquidity standards referred to as Basel III in 
December of 2010 by the Basel Committee on banking Supervision.  Basel III was a series of 
corrections to the last Basel II framework. Its inception resulted in several changes coming 
into effect. Previous core solvency ratios have been retained at 8% of risk weighted assets 
(‘RWAs’). Minimum common equity component would be 4.5% when fully phased in by 
2015, increasing from the previous 2%. Overall tier 1 element of the capital base (in 
addition to common equity) will be 6% when fully phased in by 2019, rising from the 
previous 4% minimum (Blundell, et.al. 2010:11).  
     A capital conservation buffer made of an equity level of 2.5% of RWAs would be in place 
when fully phased in by 2019. It was suggested that where an institution has capital within 
the parameters of the buffer (with common equity of between 4.5% and 7%) dividend 
payouts, share buybacks and bonus will be subjected to control. An additional counter 
cyclical capital buffer would be imposed where necessary, especially during times of 
excessive credit growth to be released during times of credit contraction. It was agreed that 
the capital conservation buffer requirement will apply as of January 1, 2016 at 0.625%. 
From January 1, 2017 it will  move to 1.25% and to 1.875% as of January 1, 2018 before 
rising to the full 2.5% level by January 1, 2019 (at which the total tier 1 common equity 
target would be 7%, that is, a 4.5% minimum and a 2.5% conservation buffer) (Blundell, et. 
al. 2010:12). 
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     Under Basel III, banks that met minimum ratio  requirements, but remained below the 
7% tier common equity target, would be expected to maintain prudent earnings retention 
policies with the view to meet the conservation buffer as soon as reasonably possible. Basel 
Committee suggested that a quicker implementation would be appropriate in countries 
that were experiencing excessive credit growth. A second buffer, ranging from 0% to 2.5% 
of tier 1 common equity to RWAs, would be imposed by a national authority in times of 
excessive credit growth. The buffer was intended to lower its cost during a down turn. The 
countercyclical capital regime would be phased together with the capital conservation 
buffer requirement on January 1, 2016, becoming fully effective on January 1, 2019. 
     The national regulator would permit the release of the buffer of any size and at any time 
to the extent deemed necessary to achieve the buffer objective. Accenture (2011:6) 
believed individual countries were at liberty to consider other factors in making buffer 
decisions and may well exercise their discretion in very different ways. As a consequence, 
how, when and the magnitude to which the buffer would be used in practice would remain 
ambiguous for some time. It was however, the opinion of the Basel III Committee that the 
use of a buffer was particularly appropriate when the stock of national credit was excessive 
relative to the historical trends.  
     In cases where a banking group had operations in more than one country, it was 
required to calculate its own counter cyclical capital buffers in force in each Basel III 
country to which the group had any credit exposure.  It was referred to as the 
‘jurisdictional reciprocity’. It aimed to create a level playing field for all institutions 
providing credit in a given jurisdiction. In practice, it would create an economic incentive 
for banks to increase their exposures to countries with no capital buffer requirement in 
place and to lower their exposures to countries that had imposed a relatively larger buffer 
and added to the complexity related to the calculation of the buffer.   
     Under Basel III, common equity of Tier 1 consisted of ordinary share capital and retained 
profits. Non-common equity Tier 1 would be made of perpetual non-cumulative preference 
shares and other qualifying instruments. Mandatory write-down or conversions into 
common equity would apply to all additional Tier 1 instruments in the event of the 
institution becoming non – viable without a bailout. Tier 2 capital would no longer be 
categorized into lower Tier 2 (principally, dated term preference shares and subordinated 
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debt) and upper Tier 2 (including certain perpetual preferred instruments and 
subordinated debt).  
     A single set of criteria would apply to Tier 1 instruments. All Tier 2 instruments would 
be required to be either convertible into common equity or write down should a bank 
become non-viable without a bail out.  Tier 3 capital will be abolished. Tier 3 capital was 
unsecured debt that was fully paid up. This debt could only be repaid after regulatory 
approval. It had an original maturity of at least two years. Deductions from capital will be 
applied to the common equity Tier 1 component and not to the entire capital.                                                                  
BlundeII, et.al (2010:12) showed that capital as defined by the risk weighting approach 
would lead to a capital level as in: 
Min. CAP (RWA) =0.08*{12.5(OR+MR) +SUM [w (i) A (i)]}                                                       (2.1) 
Where:   Min.CAP (RWA)        = minimum capital risk weighted assets 
                  MR                               = market risk 
                  OR                                = operation risk            
But capital according to a leverage ratio was defined as: 
 Min CAP (LR)                              =βSUM [A (i)]                                                                                   (2.2) 
Where: Min. CAP (LR)              = minimum capital leverage ratio 
                β    SUM                        = summation of risk weighted assets     
Whatever the level that was set for β, the binding constraint is the leverage ratio. 
 Min. CAP (RWA) ≤Min. CAP (LP)                                                                                                   (2.3) 
    The authors demonstrated that the ability to arbitrage the capital weights to reduce 
capital and expand leverage was very broad for banks. Where leverage was set too high 
(capital required was too low), banks would have an incentive to arbitrage the weights to 
ensure they did not hold any more capital needed.  This was a cost minimization exercise 
for banks that led regulators to effectively set maximum capital ratios in pillar I. This 
process was distortionary as had been the case in the past.  It forced banks to lower 
weighted assets and shifted promises outside the banking system-and at times was 
associated with risks of creating new bubbles and or unintended shadow banking 
developments via the regulatory arbitrage process. 
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     Such a move ensured that banks would have a minimum amount of capital sufficient to 
cover the needs of their customers.  There would be more scope for bank management to 
do their job without heavy regulatory costs. Diaz, et.al (2011:8) believed that penalizing 
regulatory arbitrage would result in less onerous modelling requirements and would avoid 
concentration coming from the Basel model framework. The added advantage was that the 
incentives for regulatory and tax arbitrage would be avoided.                                                                        
     From 2015 financial institutions would be required to maintain a liquid asset buffer 
calibrated by reference to net cash outflow over a month. It was meant to measure a bank’s 
ability to access funding for a month of acute market stress. Banks would be required to 
have a segregated stock of highly liquid and unencumbered assets that would at least equal 
to its estimated ‘net cash flows’ for a thirty day period during a time of acute liquidity 
stress. The thirty day stressed period assumed certain institution specific and system wide 
liquidity shocks including a credit rating downgrade  of the bank three notches, partial loss 
of unsecured wholesale funding, withdrawal of some retail deposits, some committed  but 
unfunded credit and liquidity lines provided by the bank being drawn down and general 
market volatility(Diaz, et.al 2011:6).   The short term Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) Basel 
has mooted was defined as: 
LCR= (High Quality Assets)/ (30 Day Net Cash Outflows) ≥100 %                                       (2.4) 
Where: LCR = Leverage Coverage Ratio 
      The value of assets and outflows referred to those that would arise with a major 
financial shock, a deposit run off and a three notch downgrade in the credit rating. High 
quality assets included central bank reserves, marketable claims on sovereigns, 
government debt issued in the currency of the country of operation. These had a low 
correlation to risky assets listed in active stable markets with market makers and low 
concentration of buyers and sellers; that is, easily convertible to cash in stressed markets. 
Corporate and covered bonds would be eligible – after a quantitative impact study. Cash 
outflows would be based on the modelling of funding run-offs: stable and less stable 
deposits, unsecured wholesale funding and secured (collaterised) funding run off.    
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    Long term liquidity problems would be addressed by the Net Stable Fund Ratio (NSFR). 
Banks would be required to have stable funding in place to address funding needs over a 
one year stressed period. The implementation of this ratio would be scheduled for 2018. 
NSRF= (AvailableStableFunding)/ (RequiredStableFunding) ≥100 %                                 (2.5) 
Where: NSFR= net stable funding ratio 
     Available Stable Funding was defined as: Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital  + preferred stock not 
in Tier 2 with maturity ≥ 1 year + liabilities ≥ 1 year  + stable shorter term retail and small 
business funding ( with ≤ € 1 m per customer)  + less stable (e.g. unfinished non maturity) 
retail and small business funding  + unsecured wholesale funding. Central bank discounting 
was excluded to avoid over reliance on central banks. The Required Stable Funding (RSF) 
was based on on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet exposure, and was defined as: Cash, 
securities ≤ 1 year, loans to financial firms ≤ 1 year + unencumbered marketable sovereign, 
central bank, BIS, MIS. Also included were AA-to-≥ 1 year loans to non financial corporate ≤ 
1 year +loans to retail clients + all else. 
      Off-balance sheet exposures to be included, would be conditionally irrevocable, and 
irrevocable credit facilities to persons, firms, SPVs and public sector entities and a 10% RSF 
of the previously undrawn portion. All other obligations would have an RSF set by the 
national supervisor.  The purpose of the NSFR was to constrain short term liquidity 
mismatches, encouraging the use of long term funding. A bank was required to have stable 
funding sources in excess of the amount of stable funding it would likely need over a one 
year period of extended market stress. Shearman and Sterling (2011:14) stated that this 
was a long term structural ratio that covered a bank’s entire balance sheet as well as 
certain off-balance sheet commitments.                   
      It was important that substantial amount of stable funding be available to finance those 
assets which were regarded as not being capable of being monetized through sale or use as 
collateral in secured borrowings during a liquidity event lasting one year. It should be 
noted that Basel Committee has already indicated that some refinements to the calculations 
of the LCR and NSFR would be necessary.    
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    Shearman and Sterling (2011:11) argued that Basel Committee found that mark- to- 
market losses caused by the deterioration of credit worthiness short of default of 
counterparty was not accurately reflected. As such, Basel III now required the use of 
stressed inputs in assessing credit risk and more capital to be held to reflect mark- to-
market losses (that is, the credit valuation adjustment risk) related to deterioration in 
counterparty’s credit quality in relation to over the counter (OTC) derivatives.  
     Basel III called for strengthened standards for collateral management and managing of 
OTC derivatives and securities financing transactions. A multiplier of 1.25 was applied to 
the asset value correlation of exposures to regulated financial firms (with assets of at least 
$100bn) and to all exposures of unregulated financial firms regardless of size. A proposed 
risk weighting of 2% in which such exposures were previously treated as risk-free would 
be applied.    
     Though the proposals for capital reform in the latest Basel III did not address the 
important problems with the risk-weighting approach, they however, did make some 
improvements with respect to some aspects of the capital management process under 
Basel II era. For example, the introduction of a leverage ratio seemed to be the single most 
important reform. Dealing with pro-cyclicality, basing Probability of Default (PD) on longer 
–run data to determine inputs for minimum capital was better than the alternative. The 
forward looking provisioning based on expected losses seemed a useful method based on 
accounting principles and provide ample scope to business to manage their businesses in a 
sensible way (Blundell, et.al 2010:15).                         
       As the case with its predecessors, the latest Basel III banking standards were not 
crafted after consulting widely with the entire global financial institutions when setting 
minimum capital levels. Under Basel III the weighting system continues to suffer from the 
assumption of portfolio invariance, or linear weighting that brings additives in the model. 
This weakness was apparent in both Basel I and Basel II. Consequently, very little was done 
in Pillar I to penalize concentration in portfolios, except insofar as model multipliers 
depended on exposure size in the treatment of counterparty risk.   
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    A one size fits all approach still underpinned the modelling process yet there existed a 
variety of risks.  Credit risk from the global business cycle risk factor was suitable for 
treatment in the Basel analytical approach. Market portfolio risk in global capital markets 
was addressed in a complex credit risk equivalent way and this was also a one size fits all 
approach. However, credit risk related to individual borrowers in a variety of business and 
regions was not well addressed in the analytical framework – leaving Basel III with the 
same problem as Basel II; that is, undue reliance on cumbersome supervisory override that 
has never worked well in the past. 
       It was charged that, there existed a problem of regulatory and tax arbitrage in 
‘complete’ markets and the shifting of financial ‘promises’.  Markets in credit made it 
difficult to expect specified ex-ante risk buckets to remain stable as a basis for holding 
capital. Differential capital weights and tax status and tax rates faced by investors could not 
be arbitraged away by leveraged trading. There were policy parameters that gave 
incentives to lessen regulatory and tax costs. A huge incentive existed in the financial 
markets to utilize ‘complete market’ techniques to reconfigure credits as capital market 
instruments to avoid capital charges and reduced tax burdens for clients, thereby 
maximizing returns for themselves and their customers. However, this continued albeit the 
proposed reforms (Shearman and Sterling, 2011:4).                                                         
      Basel III failed to deal with the required level of capital proposals. Improvements in the 
definition of capital were welcome but the Basel Committee was mum on the level at which 
the leverage ratio would be set and on how it would interact with capital weighting 
approach. This had to be deferred to be discussed with major banks in various diverse 
jurisdictions. EBA4 (2012:19) was of the view that the leverage ratio would not succeed as 
a backstop because the main concern in the reform process was to set the leverage ratio at 
a level that ensured banks truly had adequate capital across all jurisdictions. Blundell, et. al. 
 (2010:15) were of the view that the leverage ratio should not be thought as a backstop 
measure because of how ineffective the capital weighting approach had been. They 
believed that risk weighting and leverage ratio were not compatible to each other. 
 
                                               
4
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     Methods of credit risk assessments, which were the standardized approach, internal 
ratings based approach and the advanced internal ratings based approach were maintained 
under Basel III as was the case in Basel II. The standardized approach was concerned with 
counterparty’s credit rating to determine the credit risk of that counterparty. The 
foundation and the advanced approaches determined the mechanisms for calculating the 
three variables which were used in computing the credit risk component of capital 
requirement for institution, especially probability of default (‘PD’), loss given default 
(‘LGD’) and exposure at default (‘EAD’).  
     Under the standardized approach, PD and LGD were incorporated into the weightings 
prescribed by Basel II and credit conversion factors were used to calculate PD. While LGD 
and EAD inputs would be provided by the regulator. The advanced internal ratings based 
approach allowed a bank to calculate all three variables using internal models, though the 
formula used in the model would be agreed with the regulator. 
      Furthermore, because of non consultancy in crafting of the Basel III banking standards 
Buckley (2011:298) is of the opinion that the risk weighting of assets remains a flawed 
concept unless securitized low grade debt is always required to be backed 100 % by liquid 
assets. Blinder (2010:1) argues that most of the changes in Basel III are based on the 
numerator that is, raising the amount of capital required and not adjusting the 
denominator which is crucial.  
       In addition, banks will need to raise at least €173billion in common equity in order to 
attain the core 4.5% common equity tier 1/Risk Weighted Asset ratio (RWA) applicable 
from 1 January 2015 and €602 billion in order to attain the 7% common equity Tier 
1/RWA ratio applicable from 1 January 2019. These figures exclude capital surcharges that 
may be imposed on banks globally by national regulators. Shearman  and Sterling (2011:9) 
state that the largest 35 US banks are short of meeting the common equity requirements by 
approximately $100billion, with 90% of the shortfall concentrated in the largest six banks, 
that is, Bank of America Corporation, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co, Citigroup Inc, Wells Fargo & 
Company, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc and Morgan Stanley. 
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    The resurrection of the leverage ratio with no weighting is a welcome idea, but the 
chosen capital requirement is a mere 3%, what the Lehman Brothers had when it collapsed. 
Asset growth will be affected because equity exposures affect the capital leverage ratio. The 
NSFR aims to encourage more medium term funding. It highlights the level of long term 
funding compared with short term liabilities. However, no limit has been set for the NSFR 
and it is highly unlikely it will be (Moorad, 2011:273). The exact calculation of the metric 
has not been specified; hence it should be taken in conjunction with other metrics before 
reaching regulatory compliance. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio is biased towards 
government bonds; this will work against lending to the private sector (Blundell, et.al. 
2010:19).  
        More so, liquidity proposals require more liquid assets to be held which, ceteris 
paribus, may lower returns. This may increase the incentive for excess risk taking in other 
areas. Some monetarists believe liquidity ratios only look at liquidity gaps in defined time 
horizons and not in other periods. 
         Basel III propose liquidity ratios to be calculated using predetermined standard 
aggregations and stress assumptions, yet the significance of these may differ substantially 
across banks with different sizes and business models in different countries. A counter 
cyclical buffer constituting of equity absorbing capital has been mooted. It can range from 
0% to 2.5% of risk weighted assets depending on the changes in the credit-to-GDP ratio. 
South Africa believes the calibrations used in the calculations do not reflect its financial 
market structure (FSB, 2012:18). Shearman and Sterling (2011:10) believes the method 
may prove difficult for banks with operations internationally since the counter cyclical 
buffer required will have to be a weighted average of all the counter cyclical buffers in force 
in countries in which it has credit exposure.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
     The Basel banking standards have received considerable research in the field of 
monetary economics since the financial crises that hit Europe and America in 1974. In 
providing a background view of the studies done for the Basel standards, this chapter will  
unpack the studies that were done in Europe, America, Africa and Asia on the leverage 
ratio, the anti-cyclical buffers, the level of capital adequacy, as well as how these were 
measured.   
 3.1 Review of previous studies conducted for the Basel Standards 
     Ever since the inception of the Basel banking standards numerous studies have been 
conducted to investigate the applicability, practicality and robustness of the requirements 
in stemming off business cycles emanating from the financial system.  Recently, the OECD 
studies observed that at the time of the 2008 crisis, banks did not have enough capital. A 
regulatory and supervisory integration that allowed guarantees in the financial system to 
be transformed with derivatives, and passed out to the less-regulated and capitalized 
industries outside of banking, such as insurance and re-insurance was non-existent.  
Similar guarantees in the financial system were not given equal treatment (Blundell, et.al. 
2010:20). 
     Furine (2000) in an econometric study (based on 362 American banks) revealed that 
though many factors might conceivably have accounted for changes in banks’ portfolios, 
only changes in capital regulation simultaneously elucidated all of the observed 
alterations(Jablecki, 2009:12). Haubrich and Watchtel (1993:9) observed that American 
banks had substantially increased their holding of government securities from roughly 
15% in 1989 to 22% of their total assets in 1993 because of the introduction of capital 
regulations. They believed the regulations constrained bank lending and contributed to a 
slowdown of the economy.  
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    Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2011:1) investigated the impact of debt on GDP. They 
used a data set that included the level of government, non-financial corporate and 
household debt in eighteen OECD4 countries from 1980 to 2010. The study found that 
beyond a certain level debt is a drag on GDP. The study found that government debt had a 
threshold of around 85% of GDP.  The immediate implication was that countries with high 
debt would act quickly and decisively to address their fiscal problems. The lesson was to 
build the fiscal buffer required to address extraordinary events, and governments would 
keep debt well below the estimated thresholds. The study also found that other type of debt 
yielded similar conclusions. When corporate debt was beyond 90% of GDP, it became a 
drag on growth.  And as for household debt, the study reported a threshold around 85% of 
GDP, despite the impact being imprecisely estimated.  
     Debt and GDP had an association with Basel in that , Basel capital requirements  
proposed a variety of methods, such as the discretionary system , the formula driven 
approach or a mixture of both to counter cyclicality which was caused by debt and granting 
of credit . Griffiths, et. al. (2009:7) supposed that as banks created credit and entered into 
more debt they were exposed to risk of failure which caused gross domestic product to 
contract. The authors suggested that regulation of debt and credit is necessary to eliminate 
any downswings correlated to these variables. 
      Wasiuzzaman and Tarrmizi (2011:14), in a study of the impact of leveraging on bank 
profitability on Islamic banks in Malaysia, used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method to 
analyze the data collected from sixteen Islamic banks in order to understand the 
significance of leveraging and the determinants of Islamic banking profitability in Malaysia. 
Variables such as capitalization, asset quality, liquidity and operational efficiency were 
regressed against profitability. In addition macroeconomic variables such as gross 
domestic product and inflation were also considered in the analysis. The study found that 
capital and asset quality were inversely related with bank profitability while liquidity and 
operational efficiency had a positive influence.  
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     Naidu (2011:86) studied the implications of capital structure and regulation on South 
Africa’s four major banks, namely, Absa, Nedbank, Standard bank and First National Bank. 
It was found that an increase in leverage increased the volatility of a bank’s earnings. The 
study used the trade-off theory of Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe and Jordan, 2008. The results 
showed that an increase in leverage ratio beyond a certain threshold increased the 
financial risk of the bank. The growth of the debt increased the costs of servicing that debt 
which was deleterious to the banks’ cash flow. Overly the risk of bankruptcy was 
accelerated together with the related costs of financial distress. The demands on cash flow 
and earnings, along with the proportion of debt on the balance sheet, would negatively 
impact the bank’s solvency and increased its probability of failure. 
    The general belief was that increased capital adequacy of a bank increased its ability to 
meet obligations and would lower the probability of financial distress. This was the 
primary objective of the Basel accord hence it propagated for minimum capital standards. 
Surprisingly, in statistical tests between capital adequacy and financial distress and 
probability of failure conducted for South Africa’s major banks, it was only Nedbank’s 
results that showed a positive correlation between capital adequacy and interest cover. 
Otherwise, the statistical test showed no significant correlation between capital adequacy 
and financial distress or capital structure and financial distress which was contrary to 
expectations (Naidu, 2011:88).   
     Rose and Gonzalez (2006:2) conducted a study on how bank capital buffers varied 
across countries using the Generalized-Method-of-Moments (GMM) estimator, developed 
for dynamic models of panel data by Arellano and Bond (1999). The method was designed 
to specifically address three econometric issues (i) the presence of unobserved bank-
specific effects which were eliminated by taking first differences of all variables, (ii) the 
autoregressive process in the data regarding the behaviour of capital buffers and (iii) the 
likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
    The panel estimator controlled this endogeneity by using instruments based on lagged 
values of explanatory variables. The study used 1337 banks across the globe from 70 
countries. After controlling for adjustment cost and endogeneity of explanatory variables, it 
was observed that capital buffers generally were positively related to the cost of deposits 
and bank market power. However, these relations varied across countries depending on 
regulation and supervision and institutions. 
        Disyatat (2008:52) however, believed the problems of the level of capital ratios 
imposed by the regulators were a source of instability in the financial institutions. It was 
suggested that given the binding risk-based capital requirement, banks would not simply 
expand credit without obtaining additional capital. 
         The Conjectural Variation Model of Bresnahan (1989) was used by Mwega (2011:5) to 
investigate how financial reforms affected the degree of credit creation in the Kenyan 
Banking sector from 1998 to 2007. Based on macroeconomic foundations this method 
allowed for the derivation of an index of the bank’s market power that was calculated as 
the deviation of the market price from the marginal cost.   Variables used included loans, 
the interest rate, exogenous factors affecting the demand for loans. Deposits were used as a 
proxy for factor inputs while loans were used as a proxy for outputs. 
      The Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) results of the study showed that all 
the estimated coefficients had the right sign. The size of aggregate loans was the variable 
that mainly drove the aggregate costs faced by banks. The coefficient of loans β1 ‹ 1 
suggested the presence of economies of scale in the banking industry. The results however, 
gave insignificant coefficients for administrative and other expenditures incurred by banks, 
with interest payments on deposits only significant at 20% level. Nonperforming loans 
ratio increased the aggregate costs faced by banks at the 20% significant level. 
    Basel Committee and Barclays Capital embarked on an impact studies of the Basel III 
prescriptions. According to the Basel Committee’s Quantitative Impact Study(‘’QIS’’), 
released December 16,2010, banks would have collectively required an additional €602 
billion of Tier 1 common equity capital at the end of 2009 in order to have satisfied new 
common equity requirements. This study used variables such as capital ratios, assets, loans 
and other rules in the accord.  The Barclays Capital study (released in November 2010), 
found that the largest 35 U.S banks were short of meeting the common equity requirements 
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of Basel III by between $100 billion and $150 billion, with 90% of the shortfall 
concentrated in the largest six banks(Shearman  and Sterling, 2011 :17). The studies 
showed that the capital shortfalls were much more pronounced for larger internationally 
active banks than for smaller banks. 
       On the LCR, Blundell, et.al (2010:19) argue that it is biased towards government bonds 
whose effect is to crowd out the private sector.  Mansson and Radstrom (2011:32) believe 
this distorts the market demand for government securities from banks and give 
governments a rare privileged position in financial markets to access cheap credit. This 
increases pressure on reserve banks to monetize governments’ debt when they get into 
financial difficulty, than they would if banks were not compelled to hold government 
securities to meet liquid asset requirements. 
       Rizwan, Khan and Haffizullah (2012:7) observed that, under Islamic law, government 
bonds are considered to be liquid but debt is not, and cannot be included in liquidity 
calculations because in Islamic finance, trading in debt is not permissible. Kosseff 
(2010:18) states that; the calibrations used in the calculation of liquidity standards do not 
accurately reflect South Africa’s financial market structure. Deposits by the public sector 
entities and wholesale funding are among the most stable funding sources in the domestic 
banking system, but both are considered less stable under Basel III.  Onorato and Mendis 
(2010:5) advocate for the development of systems on common data inputs to drive market, 
credit and liquidity risk.  
     However, Blundell, et.al (2010:15) query that the level of capital is not dealt with in the 
proposals. Monetarists in China, Singapore and Hong Kong concur with this observation, 
but are of the opinion that, the broad concept of Basel III would enhance growth 
opportunities in Asia because Chinese banks are better placed than European and 
American ones in meeting capital requirements and are therefore less constrained to make 
new loans (Phua, 2011:5). In India, private banks would shift to the more stringent capital 
requirements easily compared to some of their international counterparts because the 
regulatory requirements on capital adequacy in that country are already more tight and 
most of the banks have historically kept their core and overall capital well in excess of the 
regulatory minimum (Bhatra, et.al.2010:1). 
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     Kasekende, et.al (2013:10) referred to a study on bank regulatory capital to risk 
weighted assets in Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa conducted by 
Global Financial Stability Report( October, 2010). Twelve banks were selected, with their 
levels of capital adequacy ratios were scrutinised and found to be higher than existing 
Basel prescriptions by between 2% and 7% points. Though this was welcome, of concern 
was the view that, if banks capital ratios were to rise by less than the percentage point 
increase in the statutory minimum, and the banks were to reduce lending to private sector, 
this would have deleterious effects on economic growth. This is because the private sector 
in SACU relies heavily on bank credit for its external finance.   
     However, the study found that Basel III’s comprehensive and sophisticated requirement 
on banks to hold sufficient high quality liquid assets to cover all possible sources of 
liquidity pressures over a 30 day period, under stress conditions were in SACU banks’ 
favour because they can usefully adopt LCR into their own banking legislation as a measure 
to safeguard liquidity (Kasekende, et.al, 2013:14).  
     Gottschalk (2014:14) cited a study done by McKinsey (2013) on Basel III and the 
banking system in Swaziland and Lesotho. In that study it was observed that the challenges 
with the new capital adequacy framework arose in the areas of design, data quality, 
reporting, operations and that many banks have vastly underestimated the required efforts 
as well as the financial costs for regulatory compliance. 
    Dipatane (2012:18) in a study on the progress of the implementation of the Basel 
standards concurs with the observations made by McKinsey in Swaziland and Lesotho. The 
researcher found that most banking regulators were not giving enough support to the Basel 
banking standards. In the study the researcher cited Mr Motsomi, (Director of Banking 
Supervision at the Central Bank of Botswana) who believed that his country was 
implementing the Basel prescriptions because it was a signatory to the Breton Woods’s 
institutions, international consulting firms and rating agencies who pressurised it to 
comply with these best international regulatory standards. 
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY   
      In this study, loans will be regressed on assets of the bank to establish the nature of 
relationship between the two. The next step will involve the employment of the OLS 
technique. , which involves using a two-variable regression equation to estimate the 
strength of a bank’s leverage ratio on bank assets as a formula that protects banks from any 
form of a financial leverage. This study will conclude its estimation by using Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) to inspect the correlations between changes in levels of debt and 
changes in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and between changes in credit and changes in 
GDP including the interactions amongst these variables. The size of variation in debt and 
credit on GDP in SACU need to be attended to without delay in this study because they were 
marginally treated in the new Basel III banking standards.  
4.1 Format of data analysis 
     In studying the practicality of Basel III banking standards to SACU banks, this study will 
use panel data analysis as a method for data analysis. The choice of this method is premised 
by the nature of this study, where on average three banks are selected from each of the 
member countries that make up SACU.  In South Africa four banks will be studied as a 
panel, followed by the Namibian panel of three banks, the Botswana panel of three banks, 
the Lesotho panel of three banks and lastly the Swaziland panel of three banks. Data for all 
the members of the panel will form a sample from which estimations will be made. Panel 
data is preferred in this study due to its ability to present a hierarchical or grouping 
structure which is vital for this study and also plays an important role in modern 
econometric methodology because it is possible to take advantage of the grouping 
structure to address substantive econometric questions more completely than is possible 
with simpler forms of data.  
     Longitudinal data on variables such as assets, loans, leverage ratio, credit; debt and GDP 
are followed over a period of fourteen years from 2000 to 2013 and will be used in the 
estimations of this study. Longitudinal data analysis is plausible because it represents a 
marriage of regression and time series analysis that are composed of cross section 
variables and that can be observed over time hence allowing this study to investigate 
dynamic as well as cross-sectional aspects of the hypothesis. 
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    Frees, (2004:16) believed that  using longitudinal data than either purely cross sectional 
or  time series data is advantageous in that it is feasible to study dynamic relationships and 
model the differences, or heterogeneity , among subjects. Panel data are more informative, 
have more degrees of freedom and estimates are more efficient. They give more 
information on time –ordering of events. Bruderl, (2005:2)believed that panel data allow 
for control for individual unobserved heterogeneity and since unobserved heterogeneity is 
the problem of non-experimental research, the latter benefit is especially useful.  In using 
panel data this study will be cautious of the weakness of panel data analysis, that is, in 
panel data regular time intervals and a short panel is  assumed and the fact that parameters 
may differ over individuals or time. 
4.1.1 Ordinary Least Square estimation of the Leverage ratio on bank assets 
    Two variables will be used for this estimation, that is, the leverage ratio which will be the 
independent variable and assets the dependent variable. OLS technique will be used to 
estimate the significance of the leverage ratio on bank assets of SACU financial institutions 
from 2000 to 2013. This study finds this technique plausible because Wasiuzzaman and 
Tarrmizi (2011) employed it in a study on the impact of leveraging on bank profitability on 
Islamic banks in Malaysia. They used OLS method on data collected from sixteen banks to 
determine the significance of leveraging by regressing; assets, capitalisation and liquidity 
against profitability. It worked out well in their study because the researchers were able to 
use the OLS as estimators to provide a single value of the relevant population parameter in 
a regression of the leverage ratio on observable values of assets capitalisation and liquidity. 
          This study will espouse the Malaysian approach and employ the OLS technique in the 
estimation of the significance of the leverage ratio on bank assets. This is because by using 
the OLS technique estimators are expressed sorely in terms of the observable quantities, 
(assets and loans). This makes it easy to compute and become suitable for the purpose of 
this study. This study intends to observe the pattern followed by point estimates for the 
different panel samples in SACU on the impact of the leverage ratio on assets. Since the line 
of best fit obtained from using the OLS technique pass through sample means of the 
leverage ratio and assets and that the mean value of the estimated leverage ratio will be 
equal to the mean value of the actual leverage ratio, this study, therefore, find the technique 
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suitable.  Finally, the results for this test will be presented in tables and the p-values will 
form the basis of interpretation.        
4.1.2 Analysis of Variance on GDP using debt and credit as factors. 
     Table 1 below serves to illustrate the layout of data in the estimation of the effects of 
debt and credit on GDP. Data will be listed in tabular format with each cell identified as a 
combination of the ith level of factor debt with the jth level of factor credit. Each cell will 
contain r observations. For each level of each factor, a mean will be calculated. For instance:  
2   will be the mean for all observations that will receive the second level of factor debt (βi). 
Similarly 1 will be the mean for all observations that will receive the first level of factor 
credit (βj). The grand ( ) will represent the mean of all the observations that had been 
recorded.   
    The data to be analyzed can be listed in tabular form with each cell identified as a 
combination of the ith level of factor credit with the jth level of factor debt. Each cell 
contains r observations. For each level of each factor, a mean is calculated. The critical 
value of F will depend on the level of significance that has been selected and on the degrees 
of freedom associated with the numerator and denominator of the F statistic. If the 
calculations exceed [ᾶ; ẞ0; ẞ1] the corresponding null hypothesis will be rejected. 
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Table 4.1 ANOVA on GDP using debt and credit as factors 
               FACTOR CREDIT(β), j=1 to c Means for levels of factor A 
Factor DEBT,                                          j=1    j=2       j=c                
i=1 to d           i=1                               
 X111 
X112 
   . 
   .   
X11r                                                 
 X121 
X122 
   . 
   .   
X11r                 
X1c1 
X1c2 
      . 
      . 
X1cr  
                                                
X211 
X212 
      . 
      . 
X21r  
 X221 
X222 
   . 
   .   
X22r                                                 
 X2c1 
X2c2 
   . 
   .   
X2cr                 
                                                         
                                                          . 
                                                          .                                                                           
                                                          .   
Means for levels o  factor 
DEBT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
d 
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X d11 
Xd12 
   . 
   . 
Xd1r 
 
X d21 
Xd22 
   . 
   . 
Xd2r 
 
X dc1 
Xdc2 
   . 
   . 
Xdcr 
 
 
 
                                                 
 ...... 
                                                
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
.b. 
 
.2. 
 
.1. 
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   4.2 Calculations       
Source 
of 
Variation 
Sum of Squares Degrees of freedom Mean of Squares F-Ratio  
 
 
 Factor 
Debt 
 
 
 
 
 
MSDEBT=     
 
 
F=  
 
     
Factor 
Credit 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSCREDIT=  
 
 
 
 
F=  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interactio
n 
between 
Debt and 
Credit 
 
SSDC=SST-SSD-SSC-SSE 
 
 
 
MSDC=  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
F=  
 
Sampling 
Error, E  
SSE=       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MSE= 
     
 
 
 
 
Total, T SST=  
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     In this estimation SSC will be the sum of squares reflecting variation caused by the levels 
of factor credit. SSD is the sum of squares reflecting variation caused by the levels of factor 
debt. SSDC will be the sum of squares reflecting variation caused by interactions between 
the levels of factors debt and credit. SSE is the sum of squares reflecting variation due to 
sampling error. In this calculation, each data value will be compared to the mean of its cell. 
SST is the sum of squares reflecting the overall variation in the data with each variation 
being compared to the grand mean and then the differences are squared and summed.  
     MSD, MSC, MSDC and MSE will form the mean squares for factors debt, credit, 
interactions between debt and credit and error, respectively. Each will be obtained by 
dividing the corresponding sum of squares by the number of degrees of freedom associated 
with this sum of squares.  The results of each bank will be compared to other banks as per 
panel. 
4.3 Critical values and decisions 
1. Main effects , factor Debt: 
           Reject H0 :  all βi = 0, if F=  is ›F[βi,(d-1),dc(r-1)]. 
2. Main effects, factor Credit: 
            Reject H0 : all βj  = 0, if F =  is ›F=[βj(c-1), dc(r-1)]. 
3. Interaction effects:  
            Reject H0 : all (βiβj)ij = 0, if F=  is ›F[βi,(d-1)(c-1),dc(r-1)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
     Where the calculated F statistic appear to be large enough to suggest that sample means 
might not have been the same, this study will reject the null hypothesis at 0.025 level of 
significance.  In the hypothesis testing the significance level, the significance level is the 
criterion used for rejecting the null hypothesis. The significance level will be used in this 
study using the following procedure: firstly, the difference between the results of the 
experiment and the null hypothesis will be determined, then assuming the null hypothesis 
is true: the probability of a difference that credit and debt’s impact on GDP is large or larger 
will be computed. Finally, this probability will be compared to the significance level. Where 
the probability is less or equal to the significance level, then the null hypothesis will be 
rejected and the outcome will be said to be statistically significant.  
         Traditionally, researchers use either the 0.05 level or the 0.01 level. However, the 
choice is usually subjective. Usually, the lower the significance level, the more the data 
must diverge from the null hypothesis to be significant. Therefore, this study views a 0.025 
level of significance to be more conservative than the 0.05 level. In selecting a the 0.025 
level of significance, this study is allotting half of the alpha to testing the statistical 
significance in the one direction of  credit to GDP and half of the alpha to testing the 
statistical significance in the other direction of debt to GDP. This means, when using a 0.025 
level of significance, regardless of the direction of relationship between credit to GDP and 
debt to GDP this study hypothesizes, it will be testing for the possibility of relationship in 
both directions.   
    This study employed the ANOVA technique due to its ability to test joint hypothesis that 
the two partial slope coefficients of credit on GDP and of debt on GDP are equal to zero. 
This technique was employed in a study in Ghana by Perkins and Jonathan (2013), using 
panel and time series data analysis. Their research study was concerned about the factors 
that influence the adoption of online banking by bank customers. Data was analysed using 
multiple regression analysis in SPSS to generate ANOVA results. The researchers chose the 
ANOVA technique to estimate joint hypothesis on the factors determining online banking, 
such as Perceived Usefulness (PU), Perceived Ease of use (PEOU), as well as government 
support, trust and security. This study will also adopt ANOVA to inspect the joint effects of 
debt and credit on GDP.  
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4.2 Testing hypothesis 
4.2.1 Hypothesis for this study     
    This study will hypothesize that there is no causality between assets and loan values for 
SACU banks and as such the leverage ratio is not significant in shaping bank assets.  Having 
established the direction of causality between assets and loans and estimating on the 
efficacy of the leverage ratio in determining bank assets, this study will proceed to 
hypothesize that change in bank debt and changes in credit including the interaction effects 
of these two variables are insignificant on GDP. 
  Hypothesis: 1 there is no causation between assets and loan values for SACU banks 
and as such the leverage ratio is not significant in determining bank assets.  
  (a) There is no causation between assets and loans. 
     The starting point will be to regress advances offered by the bank to its customers on 
other assets of the bank to determine the direction of causality between these variables for 
each panel. Each panel results will be compared with those of other panels. The direction of 
causation will then be expected to provide clarity on the significance of the leverage ratio in 
determining bank assets.  Simple ad hoc distributed lag models will be employed to verify 
the direction of causality between assets and loans.  Ad hoc distributed lag model 
estimation is recommended when it is known that two variables are related but remain 
vague as to which variable leads the other to move.  The primacy of this study will be to 
empirically verify the economic theory on how changes in the value of assets explain bank 
credit creation through estimating the value of loans on the basis of varying values of 
assets. 
      Panel data on assets and loans obtainable from sampled SACU banks’ financial reports 
released annually from 2000 to 2013 will be used for this estimation. This study proposes 
to use the following ad hoc distributed models for this estimation and will specify them as: 
assets ‘’cause’’ loans (AST LNS) or loans ‘’cause’’ assets (LNS AST). 
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Causality between assets (AST) and loans (LNS) 
    The models for the causality are therefore specified as:                                                   
1 1 1
1 1
n n
t i t i j t j t
t J
LNS assets LNS 
 
                                                                                        (4.1)                                                                                                                                                
11 2
1 1
j
m m
t i t i t j t
t j
AST assets LNS 
 
                                                                                         (4.2)                                                                                               
Where:   LNS        = Loans 
                 AST         = Assets 
               λ,β1j , β1i   =   Coefficients 
                               = error term                                                                                                            
 Subscript t in the models above refers to time.                                                                                                                                    
     Model (4.1) postulates current value of loans as a function of past values of itself and 
that of assets, thus ‘’distributing’’ the impact of assets over a number of time periods, 
ranging from 1 to n.  Model (4.2) proposes current value of assets as a function of past 
values of itself and that of loans, accordingly ‘’distributing’’ the impact of loans over a 
number of time periods, ranging from 1 to m.  In model (4.1) loans are dependent on the 
explanatory variable, assets, whereas in model (4.2) assets are dependent on the 
independent variable loans. The rationale in the use of these models is to prove whether 
statistically this study can detect the direction of causality (cause and effect relationship) 
when there is temporarily a lead – lag relationship between assets and loans.  
     Using the difference in differences (DID) approach for panel data analysis; firstly, a mean 
will be computed for model (4.1) and for model (4.2) for each panel.  These averages will 
then be compared with the results from other panels. Usually the difference of the expected 
mean for assets and that for loans will be the causal effect.  Growth in assets is believed to 
have led to the rise in bank securitization during the subprime crisis. Generally, since the 
future cannot predict the past, if assets ‘’Granger causes’’ loans, then changes in assets 
should precede changes in loans. Therefore, in a regression of loans on assets (including its 
own past values) if we include past or lagged values of assets and it significantly improves 
the prediction of loans, then we can say that assets ‘’Granger causes’’ loans.          
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    This study is sensitive that causality of assets on loans is difficult to test and will, 
therefore, test for ‘’Granger causality’’. Granger causality is an incident in which one time 
series variable consistently and predictably changes before another variable (Gujarati, 
1988:620). Testing for ‘Granger causality’ will shed light as to which variable caused the 
other to change between assets and loans.   This technique is extremely useful for 
forecasting purposes and this study believes the technique will allow banks to predict the 
direction of a cycle, and be able to put control measures in place. 
      Cognizant of the significance of ‘Granger causality’, Studenmund (2006:431) cautioned 
that in spite of the value of the ‘Granger causality’, researchers should not let themselves be 
drawn into believing that it allows them to prove economic causality in any rigorous way. 
He believed that if one variable ‘Granger caused’ another, a researcher cannot be sure that 
the first variable ‘caused’ the other to change. Bos and Newbold (1984:27) substantiated 
further, when he observed that a statistical relationship, however strong and however 
suggestive, can never establish causal connections.    
     The panel data in use in this study will be stationary. Stationary data has a mean or 
variance which does not change overtime whereas non-stationary data has one or more 
basic properties that change over time. The significance for this study is that the auto-
correlation function depends on lag alone and does not change with the time at which the 
function will be calculated. This study postulates a flat looking series, without trend.     
      In this estimation, the t-statistic for the assets and loans and the coefficient of 
determination (r2) will be used to measure the direction of causality between assets and 
loans. The measure r2 is a summary measure which tells how well the sample regression 
line fits the data for a two variable regression equation. It measures the proportion of the 
total variation in loans as explained by the regression model.  An r2   measure that is close to 
1 represent an excellent overall fit, whilst an r2 close to zero shows overall weakness 
(Weiers, 2008:32).  This study will adopt Ordinary Least Squares in its analysis because of 
its attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most powerful and popular 
methods of regression analysis. The method is relatively easy to use and the goal of 
minimizing Σℯ2 is quite appropriate from a theoretical point of view. The estimated 
regression line goes through the means of loans and assets and the sum of the residuals is 
exactly zero.  
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  (b) The Leverage Ratio is not significant in determining bank assets.   
        In this part of the chapter this study will estimate the strength of the leverage ratio in 
determining the level of bank assets, consequently insulating them against financial crisis 
from financial markets as they go about allocating financial securities towards meeting the 
needs of their customers. This study defines a sound leverage ratio as that which will 
enable a bank to finance its financial obligations as they fall due at any given time.   Assets 
will be the dependent variable while the leverage ratio (debt/equity) will be the 
independent variable in this estimation. OLS will be the estimation technique. 
      Valvi, Fragkos and Frangos, (2012: 16) observed that bank assets were used as variables 
that can reflect on the continued significance of bank based financial intermediation in the 
euro area. Given that bank assets are a complex indicator and are a measure of financial 
stability this study will investigate whether the leverage ratio can have an influence on 
asset values. Where a strong influence exists the implication is that it will be possible to use 
the leverage ratio to influence the level of assets banks should maintain, so as to eliminate 
the appetite for securitization by banks. The variables that this study has selected are those 
commonly used in calculating the leverage ratio (INVESTOPEDIA, 2013:12). The model to 
be used for this estimation will be specified as follows. 
      0 1 tASSETS LR                                                                                                                (4.3)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
     Where:            LR                      =       Leverage ratio   (debt/equity)                                                                                                                
                             β0, β1                         =      coefficients  
                             t                           =     residual error term                         
   So by using this model, this study will consider how assets respond to changes in the 
leverage ratio. Since panel data analysis is preferred in this study, the estimations will be 
done for each bank and compared with those of other banks that form the panel.  The 
response will serve to indicate the extent to which the leverage ratio for banks will be able 
to capture the effects of changes of debt and equity on assets over a defined period so that 
asset levels can be easily aligned to debt and asset obligations of the bank.     
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     The study’s foundation of thinking is that banks built their asset levels from debt 
acquisition.  These financial sources reveal risk return profiles whose costs differ per bank.  
Since debt has a negative impact on the bank’s financial position, this study will adjudge the 
cost of debt to equal the weighted average values of the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio of 
this test will be obtained by dividing total bank debt with equity. 
     This study contemplates a leverage ratio that will enable SACU banks to measure a mix 
of operating costs, giving an idea of how changes in assets will affect operating income.  
This study envisages a leverage ratio which can model all market risks associated with 
bank assets and loans. Basel III banking standards want the implementation of the leverage 
ratio to lend a hand in modelling risk. Therefore, in this study assets, debt and equity are 
viewed as variables that represent major sources of bank risk and hence the reason why 
they are used in the estimation of the strength of the leverage ratio in providing bank 
stability.    
     The coefficient of correlation (r) and the t-distribution will form the metrics for the 
measurement of the strength and structural compatibility of the leverage ratio in this 
estimation. Correlation is a technique that will be used to measure and describe the 
strength and direction of the relationship between the leverage ratio and bank assets.  
Where r is positive, assets and the leverage ratio will be directly related and where r is 
negative, the variables are inversely related. 
     Furthermore, the larger the absolute values of r, the stronger will the linear relationship 
between assets and the leverage ratio. If r =-1 or r=+1, the best fit linear will actually 
include all of the data points. Where there are absolute values of r that are less than 1, the 
weaker the linear relationship will be between assets and the leverage ratio. Where r is 
equal to zero, there will be no linear relationship whatsoever between assets and the 
leverage ratio and this study will interpret the value for assets as not being influenced by 
the leverage ratio.  
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     The t-distribution is a probability density function.  The higher the absolute values of the 
t-statistic for the leverage ratio the lower will be the probability that the difference is 
random.  In other words, where the t-statistic for the leverage ratio is too far off the 
original hypothesis, the leverage ratio will be rejected as structurally significant. 
Conversely, where it is found to be close to the original hypothesis, it will likely be accepted 
as being structurally significant. The actual distribution for this test will be based on 
fourteen observations (from 2000 to 2014).                   
Testing the hypothesis at 5 percent level of significance 
   H0 :   β0 = 0                                                                                                                                                                
  (i.e. the slope coefficient for the leverage ratio is equal to zero)    
    H1 :       β1 ≠ 0                                                                     
 The slope coefficient for the leverage ratio is not equal to zero.  
 Hypothesis 2: Changes in bank debt, changes in credit including the interaction     
effects of these two variables are insignificant on GDP. 
     Having examined the significance of the leverage ratio this study will proceed to 
manipulate the technique of the Analysis of Variance to test for the significance of debt and 
credit on GDP. This technique is potent in that it allows comparison to be made between 
two or more sample means simultaneously. With ANOVA the effects of debt on GDP and of 
credit on GDP including the interaction effects between the different levels of these two 
factors on GDP can be clearly observed by this study. The outcome of this estimation will 
prove the extent to which debt and credit impact on GDP. The findings will help indicate 
the optional method that can be proposed to address cyclicality amongst the formulas 
based; the subjective or an integrated approach which blends the formulas based and the 
subjective based approaches. Various countries in the world are still not agreed on an 
acceptable and effective method to address cyclicality.    
      Weiers (2011:442) advocated for the use of ANOVA because it allows two or more 
factors and the treatments to be represented in all possible combinations of their levels.  In 
a two factor experiment (credit and debt), interaction exists when the effect of a level for 
one factor is dependent on effect of the other factor which is present. 
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       GDP is the dependent variable while debt and credit are the explanatory variables. Debt 
and credit will be the different factor levels and each factor level (or, in multiple –factor 
experiments, the intersection of a level of debt with a level of credit) will be referred to as a 
treatment. Random assignments will be made to allow other units to be subjected to each 
possible combination of the factor levels. The test units within each of these combinations 
shall be referred to as r=the number of replications with r≥2. This study will, however, 
confine itself only to the balanced design, where there will be equal numbers of 
replications(r) within each combination of factor levels.  
     For the purpose of this test, this study will implement model (4.4) below. This model is 
preferred because it is intendant to capture the effects of the factor debt and those of the 
factor credit and their interaction effects on GDP through using these variables as 
regressors. This study specifies the model as follows:   
20 31 i j ij ijkD C DCGDP                                                                                               (4.4)                                                                            
Where:    GDP = Gross Domestic Product  
       Di   = Debt 
                    C j   = Credit  
                    DCij = Debt * Credit (the interaction effect between debt and credit) 
                        β = Coefficients 
The kth observation for level i of factor debt and level j of factor credit will be xijk. It will 
comprise of the total population mean μ, the effect of the ith level of factor debt βi, the effect 
of jth level of factor credit βj, the interaction effect between level i of factor debt and level j 
of factor credit βDCij   including a random error due to sampling ∊ijk. 
   The following sets of null and alternative hypotheses will be tested and will be expressed 
in terms of the main effects, (factors Debt and Credit) and interaction effects (combinations 
of levels of these factors). 
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Assumptions: 
i) There are d   c factor – level combinations, or cells for debt and credit respectively. 
ii) The r observations in each cell will be drawn from normally distributed populations 
with equal variances. 
iii) There is bound to be some interaction between the factors 
1) Testing the main effects , factor debt: 
       H0: βi = 0 for each level of debt, with i= 1 through d. 
 (No level of factor debt has an effect on GDP.) 
 H1: βi ≠ 0 for at least one value of i, with i=1 through d. 
 (At least one level of factor debt has an effect on GDP) 
2) Testing the main effects, factor credit: 
H0:  βj = 0 for each level of credit, with j=1 through c 
 (No level of credit has an effect on GDP.) 
H1: βj ≠ 0 for at least one value of j, with j = 1 through c   
 (At least one level of factor credit has an effect on GDP.)  
3) Testing for interaction effects between levels of Debt and Credit: 
H0: β DCij = 0 for each combination of i and j. 
(There are no interaction effects on GDP) 
H1: β DCij ≠ 0 for at least one combination of i and j has an effect on GDP). 
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    There were d * c factor level combinations, or cells. It was assumed that r observations in 
each cell had been drawn from normally distributed populations with equal variances. The 
assumption of no interactions was no longer applicable.  
    For each null hypothesis to be tested, a separate test statistic will be calculated. The 
numerator and denominator will be separate estimates of the variance that the cell 
populations will assume to share. For each null hypothesis, the critical value of F dependent 
on a 0.025 level of significance and on the number of degrees of freedom associated with 
the numerator and denominator of the F statistic will be compared.  Where if a calculated F 
statistic exceeds F[βi, βj, βDCij], the corresponding null hypothesis will be rejected.  
     In this chapter an outline on the methodology this study will use in testing the two 
hypotheses have been suggested. The discussion elucidates what the models selected for 
the estimations of the hypotheses will achieve and how this will be done.  In the following 
chapter findings of this study will be presented. 
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CHAPTER 5 – ANALYSIS OF RESULTS    
      In this chapter results for estimations of the hypotheses are analyzed in line with how 
the hypotheses are laid out in the previous chapter. Results on causality between assets 
and loans will be analyzed first, followed by findings on the efficacy of the leverage ratio in 
influencing growth of assets for banks, using Ordinary Least Square technique. Findings on 
the scope of power of debt and credit on GDP will be analyzed last.    
5.1 Presentation by hypothesis 
5.1.1 Hypothesis 1: There is no causality from assets to loans and vice versa. 
        In this section, tables displaying findings of the estimation for the direction of causality 
between assets and loans are presented as a group for the whole of SACU. First are results 
for panel South Africa, followed by the outcome from panel Namibia, panel Botswana, panel 
Lesotho and Swaziland respectively. The table is divided into five columns; the first column 
shows the country where the test was carried out, followed by the null hypothesis, the 
column for number of observations. Column four shows the F-statistic and lastly the 
probability of happening is in column five.  
        The sample observations covered period 2000 to 2013, which constitute 52 
observations for panel South Africa and 39 for other panels. Panel South Africa has more 
observations than others because of the number of banks that make up the sample. 
After the table presentations, the analysis of the outcomes as displayed in the table will 
follow, including possible explanations to the variations in the findings for the different 
panels. 
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5.1 Result of the causality between assets and loans for SACU banks 
Country Null Hypothesis Observation F-Statistic Probability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
South 
African 
banks 
 
 
Loans does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Assets 
Assets does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Loans 
             52 
 
0.72695 
0.47249 
 
0.3980 
0.4951 
 
 
 
Namibian 
banks 
Loans does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Assets 
Assets does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Loans 
              39     7.42289 
14.3696 
 
0.0099 
0.0006 
 
 
 
 
Botswana 
banks 
Loans does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Assets 
Assets does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Loans 
               39 1.46033 
0.92914 
0.2348 
0.3415 
 
 
 
Lesotho 
banks 
Loans does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Assets 
Assets does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Loans 
               39 0.12084 
1.03979 
 
0.7302 
0.3147 
 
 
 
Swaziland 
banks 
Loans does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Assets 
Assets does not ‘’Granger Cause’’ 
Loans 
               39 0.73658 
0.45608 
 
0.3964 
0.5038 
 
 
 
  
ANALYSIS: By Author 
 
Table 5.1 above shows the estimation results for the direction of causality from loans to 
assets and from assets to loans for all panels of SACU. The F- statistics of 0.47249 is for the 
model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ assets and 0.72695 for the model assets do not 
‘’Granger cause’’ loans. The p-values for the model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ assets is 
0.3980 and 0.47249 for model assets do not ‘’Granger cause’ loans. Both models’ p-values 
are more than the 0.05 level of significance.  
       Likewise, Botswana’s results confirm that the probability of occurrence for the model 
assets ‘’Granger cause’’ loans is 0.2348 and 0.3415 for the model loans do not ‘’Granger 
cause’’ assets. This probability of occurrence is way beyond the 0.05 level of significance. 
The F-statistics for the model assets do not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans is at 1.46 and 0.93 for the 
model loans do not Granger cause assets. Based on a 0.05 level of significance the results of 
the two panels fail to reject the null hypothesis that assets do not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans 
and that loans do not ‘’Granger cause assets’’.  
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      Correspondingly results for Lesotho and for Swaziland prove non-existence of causality 
between loans and assets. The F- statistics of 0.12 is identified for the model assets do not 
‘’Granger cause’’ loans and 1.039 for model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ assets for panel 
Lesotho.  The probability value of 0.7302 for model assets do not ‘’Granger cause loans and 
0.3147 for model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans are more than the 0.05 level of 
significance. In Swaziland, the model assets do not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans specifies an F-
statistics of 0.73658 and 0.456 for model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ assets.  Once again 
the significant levels of 0.3964 for model assets do not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans and 0. 503 for 
model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ assets are more than the 0.05 level of significance.  
Premised on the results above, this study cannot reject the null hypothesis that assets do 
not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans or that loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ assets in South Africa, 
Swaziland, Lesotho and in Botswana. 
          Divergent results are those from panel Namibia, where causality is detected.  Results 
for Namibia shows an F- statistics of 7.42289 for model assets do not ‘’Granger cause’’ loans 
with a chance of occurrence of 0.0099 and 14.3696 for model loans do not ‘’Granger cause’’ 
loans with a corresponding prospect value of 0.0006.  These probability values are both 
less than the 0.05 level of significance for the panel.  Grounded on these findings, this study 
can reject the null hypothesis that loans do not ‘‘Granger Cause’’ assets or that assets do not 
‘‘Granger Cause’’ loans in Namibia given a 0.05 level of significance. The conclusion is that 
there is a bi-directional causality from loans to assets and from assets to loans at a 0.05 
level of significance for the Namibian panel.  
           It is projected that assets are ‘‘Granger causal’’ for loans if assets help precede loans 
at some stage in the future or loans is ‘‘Granger causal’’ for assets if loans help precede 
assets at some stage in the future.  Absence of direction of causality in the South African 
panel is stuck in the monetary policy of South Africa. The South African Reserve bank uses 
a classical cash reserve system as a framework for its monetary policy implementation. In 
this framework an appropriate liquidity requirement or structural money market shortage 
is created by levying a cash reserve requirement on banks. This strategy removes any 
unwanted excess liquidity in the economy, and assists in explaining why it is unlikely to tell 
the direction of causation between assets and loans in panel South Africa.  
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    The main refinancing operation is the weekly seven-day repurchase auction, conducted 
with the commercial banks at the repo rate determined by the monetary policy committee. 
The reserve bank lends funds to the banks against eligible collateral comprising of assets 
that also qualify as liquid assets in terms of the prudential liquid asset requirement. Under 
such a regulation any excess liquidity is eliminated making it intricate to contrast the 
direction of causality from assets to loans and from loans to assets.   
     This study would like to advance that the sampling period could have had a bearing on 
the outcome of results in this investigation. A long sampling period can hide the direction 
of causality in variables under study. In this estimation 13 years is quite a momentous 
period to hide the direction of causality from assets to loans and from loans to assets. 
Another view this study would put forward, is that of the preferred lag. The chosen lag 
could have impacted on the direction of causality. Where different lags are used the result 
can be different. In this study lag1 is preferred because it is conjectured that the current 
values of loans are based on both the current values of assets and the one past period 
values of assets. However, had any other lag been used a different result would have been 
obtained. These are some of the limitations of using ‘‘Granger causality’’ as an estimating 
tool. 
      The result for Botswana is plausible because of the operational implementation of 
monetary policy of Botswana which is undertaken through trading a variety of money 
market instruments with domestic banks. By using weekly Open Market Operations 
(OMOs) auctions of the Bank of Botswana Certificates (BoBCs) the bank has succeeded in 
influencing liquidity conditions in the domestic money market. 
     OMOs are centered weekly sales by auction of fourteen- day BoBCs and in support of 
these short term operations there are also monthly auctions for 90-day BoBCs. Given that 
the rationale to using these instruments is to manage liquidity in the banking system and 
not envisioned for general investment purposes, few banks are allowed to hold them. As in 
South Africa this monetary policy measure is meant to wipe out excess liquidity that may 
lead to an increase in bank assets. Under such circumstances causality between the two 
variables is unlikely to be substantiated. 
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       The size of Lesotho’s economy is reason why it is difficult to quantify the direction of 
causation between assets and loans. Geographically, Lesotho is a small kingdom within the 
boundaries of the South African economy and is economically integrated with it as well. 
The economy of Lesotho is based on agriculture, livestock and depends heavily on inflows 
of workers’ remittances and receipts from SACU. The majority of households subsist on 
farming. The formal sector employment consists mainly of female workers in the apparel 
sector and the male migrant labour primarily as miners in South Africa. Besides, a fall in 
money supply by 0.9 percent in June 2013 due to a decline in net foreign assets of the 
banking sector and a further decline of 1.0 percent in May, 2013 are factors that might have 
impacted on causality between assets and loans in this economy as growth is generally 
subdued.  
     Causality could not be ascertained in Swaziland because of the deceleration in credit 
extension to the private sector from double digit growth of 18.2 percent to 1.4 percent up 
to February 2013(Kosseff, 2010:7). The decline in credit extension was due to loan 
repayments since 2010. The curtailment of credit meant that banks could not generate 
loans. This Namibian result is potent because Namibian banks are primary mobilizes of 
funds from the public and the main sources of financing for the economy. As such banks 
generate more assets which influence the volume of loans in the economy.  
       A case in point is that following contractions and low growth rate levels in the first half 
of 2012, the bank of Namibia lowered interest rates and this led to growth in credit 
creation asset holdings by banks. Furthermore, overdraft lending increased by 12.1 percent 
on year on year in August of 2012. Mortgage loans continued to make up the largest 
category of private sector credit. They grew by 13. 5 percent on year on year because of 
properties in the upper price segment (Bank of Namibia, 2012:1).  Private sector credit 
growth increased to 14.2 percent in August, from 13.2 percent in the previous month. This 
growth was driven by loans to both households and business, which experienced growth of 
14.2 and 14.3 percent, respectively. 
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5.1.2 Hypothesis 2: The Leverage Ratio is not significant in determining bank assets.  
    The approach below is to firstly present the tables in a single group as was the case in 
hypothesis 1 above. In the tables below the explanatory variable is Leverage ratio (L/R) 
and the dependent variable is assets. In this estimation observations of asset values and 
leverage ratios from 2000 to 2013 are used. There will be a total of 52 observations for the 
panel of South Africa due to the number of banks it contributes to this study. The rest of 
SACU members will be made up of 39 observations.  Thereafter, analysis of the outcome is 
provided for all panels as a group. This approach is preferred because it allows comparison 
to be done for the whole of SACU. 
         It should be noted that, the regression output for the tests in the table below violates 
one of the OLS assumptions. The classical view is that autocorrelation does not exist in the 
disturbances. In this instance the classical model would assume that the disturbance term 
relating to assets in one period would not have a bearing on the level of assets for the 
following period. In this study there is dependence in the data. The disruption caused by 
assets level in one period affect the value of assets in the next period; this is serial 
correlation. Tintner, cited by Gujarati (1988:401) defined serial correlation as ‘’lag 
correlation between two different series’’. Therefore to solve this problem an alternative 
method would be to lag the leverage ratio.   
      Results in tables A1; A3; A4 and A5 in Appendix A express the leverage ratio to be 
significant in determining bank assets in the panels of South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland 
and Lesotho. The r measure for the South African panel is √0.327309 = 0.57 with an 
analogous t-statistic for the L/R of 5.1.   This measure is positive and indicates a strong 
linear relationship between assets and the L/R.  Results for Botswana indicates that the r 
size is √0.126676 = 0.36. This result, though it points to a weak linear relationship between 
assets and the L/R, the t-statistic for L/R of 2.4 is significant. Besides, the p-value of 0.0207 
is below the level of significance of 0.05. 
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         The r measure for the Swaziland panel is √0.66700 = 0.81 and depicts a strong linear 
relationship between assets and the L/R.  This result is validated by the p- value of 0.0000 
for L/R which is below the critical level of significance of 0.05. In Lesotho the r statistic is 
√0.624397 = 0.79, this is an indication of a strong linear relationship between assets and 
L/R in this economy.  This result is confirmed by the value of the calculated t-statistic for 
L/R of 8.15 which is significant. Similarly, the probability value of 0.0000 is below the 
critical level of significance of 0.05. The insinuation from these results is that the L/R 
influenced bank assets in South Africa, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho for the period 
under investigation. Based on these findings this study is able to reject the null hypothesis 
that the L/R is not significant in controlling bank assets in South Africa, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Lesotho.  
     The result for the South African panel is concrete because of its large and sound 
economy in Africa. The economy attracts huge levels of assets across SACU and the rest of 
the world. The monetary authorities always monitor banks on how they use the L/R in 
influencing their bank assets. Notice that the r-statistic for the L/R of South African panel is 
not as large as that of Lesotho and Swaziland, rather resembles that of Botswana because of 
the refinancing policies used by the two countries. Banks are precluded from amassing 
excess assets; hence this might have depressed the impact of L/R on assets in these 
countries to magnitudes of Swaziland and Lesotho.  
    The result for Botswana is credible given the small size of the economy and the 
operational implementation of monetary policy of Botswana which is undertaken through 
trading (BoBCs) with domestic banks. Its motive is to eliminate any accumulation of excess 
liquidity that might find it increasing the growth of assets by banks. What is evident is that 
the L/R is being complimented by other policy measures to influence bank assets, hence 
these other measures emboldens the prowess of the L/R. 
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       Swaziland thrives on the Risk Based Supervision (RBS) approach to banking inspection. 
This approach envisages the monitoring of banks by allocating supervisory resources and 
concentrating supervisory attention according to the risk profile of the bank. The process 
involves a persistent monitoring and evaluation of the appropriateness of the risk 
management systems and control environment of the supervised institution in line with its 
business strategy and exposures, with ultimate goal to quantify its riskiness. 
        To show that it was concerned; in 2011, in which the central bank took a proactive 
supervisory approach to ameliorate liquidity risk by assessing the minimum liquidity 
requirement of the banking sector. This policy was premised in view of the banking sector’s 
role in intermediation which makes them inherently susceptible to the risk, especially in 
cases where creditors’ demands for repayment may exceed their potential to liquidate their 
assets.  This statutory minimum requirement serves to augment the L/R and maintain a 
balance in the trade off in liquid assets and the utilization of deposits by Swaziland banks. 
       The geographical location of Lesotho is reason why the leverage ratio is significant in 
determining the level of assets because it benefits from the size of economy of South Africa.  
An additional explanation could be that the method of accounting that is being used across 
the jurisdiction of SACU is not uniform. It could be possible some banks are ignorant on 
which assets to record, say, under cash reserve requirements. 
         On the contrary, results from panel Namibia in table A2 in Appendix A are at variance 
with those of other panels of SACU on this hypothesis. The r measure for the Namibian 
panel is √0.010057 = 0.10. This measure though positive, point to a weak linear 
relationship between assets and the L/R. The corollary is that the L/R had a fragile 
influence on Namibian banks’ assets during the period under investigation.  This result is 
confirmed by the value of the calculated t-statistic for L/R of -0.63, which is not significant. 
This result ascends at a p-value of 0.5275 which falls beyond the significance level of 0.05. 
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        In Namibia, the potency of the leverage ratio is insignificant due to the different trends 
in financial innovation. Significant leverage is assumed through economic and embedded 
leverage, which is not recorded on the balance sheet in most of its banking institutions. 
Furthermore, a leverage ratio cannot be expected to do the job alone, as is the case in this 
economy. It needs to be complemented by other prudential tools to ensure a 
comprehensive picture of the built up of leverage in individual banks as well as the entire 
financial system.  Additional measures to provide a complete picture of leverage, including 
embedded leverage, and to trigger enhanced surveillance by supervisors, need to be 
improved. This is the approach being used by the South African and Botswana monetary 
authorities to supplement the leverage ratio in the refinancing policy.  
5.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Changes in bank debt, changes in credit including the interaction 
effects of these two variables are insignificant on GDP. 
    In this section, the technique of ANOVA is being used to analyze the effects of the 
explanatory variables of debt and credit on GDP. For each panel there are three sub- tables, 
as shown in Appendix B. The  first one shows the method, followed by the table of analysis 
of variance and lastly the category statistics for variables debt, credit and debit and credit 
in that order. Like the approach used for the hypotheses above, 52 observations for 
variables GDP, debt and credit from 2000 to 2013 are employed for panel South Africa and 
39 for the rest of the panels.  Tables are grouped and presented in Appendix A, as A6, A7, 
A8, A9 and A10. 
     This test is being carried out at α=0.05 level. The critical value of F is F (0.05, 2, 55) 
=2.39. In South Africa the calculated F-value of 7.66 exceeds the critical value of 2.39. 
Besides, a p-value of 0.0001 is far below the 0.05 level of significance. In Namibia, 
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho the critical value of F is (F 0.05, 2, 41) =3.23. In contrast 
the calculated F-value for Namibia is 134.77, while that of Swaziland is identified as F = 
38.13. Botswana and Lesotho also displays a calculated F-value of 169.86 and 19.79 
respectively. It is perceptible that in all panels under investigation the calculated F-statistic 
exceeds the critical values at a probability level of 0.0000 which is below the 0.05 level of 
significance. Premised on these findings, this study cannot accept the null hypothesis that 
the population means equal zero.  At this level of significance the conclusion for this study 
is that debt and credit and the interaction thereof had a significant effect on GDP in SACU.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION  
   This section summarises, concludes, suggests policy recommendations and highlights 
some limitations encountered. The policy recommendations will give guidance as to what 
banks within the SACU bloc will need to do in order to maintain enough capital 
requirements. Limitations are also presented under this section.  
6.1 Summary of findings  
      Results on the direction of causality on estimations conducted on all SACU panels, 
except for Namibia, showed that assets did not ‘Granger cause’ loans and that loans did not 
‘Granger cause’ assets. Results for Namibia point to a bi-directional causality from assets to 
loans, and from loans to assets. Estimation on the supremacy of the L/R in South Africa, 
Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho on bank assets was significant; nonetheless, this was not 
the case in Namibia. The existence of different accounting methods used in SACU made it 
difficult for this study to draw valid conclusions on the significant of the L/R and on the 
direction of causality of assets and loans. Moreover, asset treatment differed across most of 
SACU countries.   
       Monetary economists should also be cognisant that the leverage ratio uses short term 
liabilities in the numerator, yet investors rely on long term debt. This will lead to failure by 
the ratio to prove the correct financial position for banks. This is the reason why other 
banks are substituting total liabilities with long term debt when crunching numbers.  
      However, it was observed within SACU that the leverage ratio, if well used, can help 
indicate the degree of vulnerability when banks make large debts during a down turn. It is 
evident that, in some countries the central bank supplements the leverage ratio to 
influence the level of assets in the economy. Where such supplementary measures have 
been used it has worked positively to eliminate excess liquidity, thereby creating stability 
in the economy.  
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     ANOVA showed that bank debt and credit had a momentous impact on GDP for the 
period under review in all panels under investigation. It is evident that the problem for 
banks does not lie in borrowing per se. Rather, the problem lies in the use of debt, 
especially once it becomes excessive, with interest taking a huge chunk out of banking 
income, the bank will have less income to fund other important customer obligations. 
        The outcome on the significance of the leverage ratio in this study is synonymous with 
the results of Wasiuzzaman and Tarrmizi (2011:14) in a study on the impact of the 
leverage ratio on Islamic banks in Malaysia. Using OLS technique they were able to 
conclude that the leverage ratio was significant on bank profitability, capital and asset 
quality.  In SACU the leverage ratio was found to be significant on determining bank assets.  
       Naidu (2011:86)’s findings on the impact of debt and credit on GDP, were also similar 
to the findings of this study. In that study it was concluded that the growth in debt 
increased the cost of servicing that debt which was detrimental to the economic growth of 
a country and the banks. The same conclusion was reached by Cecchetti, et.al, (2011:1). 
They found out that beyond a certain level debt is a drag on GDP.  This study using the 
technique of ANOVA also came to the conclusion that debt and credit, including their 
interaction effects, have a negative impact on GDP. 
6.2 Implications of the findings  
     The findings on causality between assets and loans acquaint monetary economists with 
knowledge that, not all relationships are causal in this sector of the economy. Any results 
from investigations directed towards causality between financial variables cannot be 
completely the result of one or two variables directly impacting on each other’s, rather 
other unidentified factors in the banking industry could be responsible.  Therefore, a 
multifaceted approach is required when pondering on the causality between variables in 
the banking industry. 
    The choice of the sampling period had a bearing on the direction of causality between 
loans and assets. A long sampling period could have contributed to hiding the direction of 
causality in some panels and the lag value used by this study could also have influenced the 
direction of causality.  
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    The repurchase and refinance framework as applied by South Africa and Botswana have 
helped in curtailing banks from generating unwarranted assets or loans.  The refinancing 
frame work has been used as a supplementary tool to the leverage ratio. This has worked 
positively as the South Africa and Botswana economies have managed to weather much of 
the crisis that is associated with financial markets. The implication here is that the leverage 
ratio should be used with other banking measures, for it to be effective. 
     The variation in results for different panels in the leverage ratio might have been 
because of the problem of data quality checks undertaken by some banks within SACU. 
Some banks  such as African Development bank and Capitec bank are unsure about the 
application of the cash reserve requirement treatment, for instance the manner in which 
derivative exposure, cash collateral and Securities Financing Transactions are reported is 
not in tandem with current Basel III prescriptions.  
      This study will further claim that in some instances regulation has a bearing on the way 
the leverage ratio is being applied by banks. A case in point is the South African Regulation 
38 (17). It stipulates that a bank shall manage its business at a leverage ratio that is less 
than 4 percent.   This ratio will be determined by the Registrar in consultation with the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank and it shall in no case be less than 3 percent. The Financial 
Mail, July 2013 deems that such a regulation led Nedbank to have the highest leverage ratio 
of 8.5 percent followed by ABSA at 8 percent with Standard bank at 7, 1 percent and 
FirstRand at 7 percent. Such ambiguity in the right level of calibration of the leverage ratio 
is likely to leave banks in a situation of uncertainty and panic on the levels of asset holdings 
and the leverage ratio to use rendering its use irrelevant.  
     What is also clear in the case above is that the relaxation by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision of some of its controversial leverage rules in Basel III has begun to 
encourage banks to increase lending.  There is no transparency on how banks in SACU are 
coming up with their risk inputs. A case in point is that of African Development Bank and 
Capitec bank of South Africa.   Unsecured lending was extended to Capitec Bank by African 
Development Bank and this later caused operational and systemic risk on the balance sheet 
of the African Development Bank.  This variability or data manipulation, implies banks in 
SACU are ending up with very different levels of capital which are not ample to help them 
sustain unexpected loses. 
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      This study is of the opinion that the placement of the African Development Bank under 
curatorship by the South African Reserve Bank on August 10, 2014 and the subsequent 
downgrading of Standard bank; FNB, Nedbank, ABSA and Capitec bank by Moody’s Rating 
Agency is evidence enough to manifest the weaknesses in the understanding of the 
implementation of the leverage ratio and other capital based rules in SACU. The implication 
is that there is need to come up with a common benchmark for application of the leverage 
ratio if it is to be helpful globally. This study, will therefore, maintain that as long as there is 
no harmonization on accounting methods on the implementation of the current 
prescriptions of the Basel regime it will remain impossible to evaluate the efficacy of these 
rules across the globe.  
       The ratio of a country’s debt to its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) indicates a country’s 
ability to pay back its debt. The higher the debt to GDP ratio, the less likely the country will 
pay its debt back and the higher its risk of default. Findings from ANOVA show rising debt 
accumulation by SACU members, such as Swaziland, South Africa and Lesotho. This is the 
reason why there is a downward trend in the economic growth of these SACU member 
countries. The implication drawn from this study is that the formula driven approach could 
be the panacea to cyclicality because a formula can be worked out on the acceptable levels 
of debt and credit for a country so as to avoid business cycles that are currently 
experienced in SACU due to ignorance on the right method to use on issues of debt 
management.  
6.3   Limitations encountered in this study 
       This study was constrained in that banks in SACU used different leverage ratios, as such 
this compromised comparison of results. Most SACU countries also use different monetary 
policy approaches to the treatment of assets levels in their economies in an attempt to 
eliminate excess liquidity. That variation in policy approach had a bearing on arriving at 
the correct conclusion on the direction of causation between loans and assets.   
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6.4 (a) Recommendations on how to maintain Capital Adequacy for SACU Banks  
SACU banking authorities need to maintain the correct match between assets and liabilities 
of the bank because any source of mismatch between these two variables will lead to 
insolvency by a bank leading to a ban run. 
    Central banks of SACU should tighten bank regulation and supervision to avoid banks 
from undertaking excessive risk transactions which is a major cause of capital inadequacy 
in most SACU banks. All financial operations entail risks. Managing them well is critical for 
banking authorities. The basis of efficient risk management and a good risk adjusted return 
is pivotal to generate enough cash that will sustain the bank into the future.  
     SACU banks need to be well capitalised. Cost benefit analysis should be used as a formula 
to determine capital adequacy levels.  However, regulators should select a capital level that 
is flexible enough to allow the mean or modal behaviour of regulated banks, and only 
outliers at the low end. This approach will impose zero costs on most banks and require a 
change of behaviour only in the weakest banks, which must either raise capital or liquidate.  
     It should however be noted that maintaining Capital Adequacy has its limitations. One of 
this is the loss of profit potential that a bank institution suffers by complying with capital 
regulations. This probably explains why most SACU banking executives are reluctant to 
implement some of these requirements. 
    Tier 2 Capital-which is mainly debt can be costly to banks because, authorities cannot cut 
interest rate obligations, compared to tier 1 Capital- which is mainly equity. Under tier 1 
Capital banks can cut dividends when cash is needed. Trading in derivatives will be done in 
organised exchanges or will require a full financial back-up of transactions. The 
introduction of the leverage ratio implies a corresponding capital ratio. Without the 
leverage ratio it is feasible for banks to hold a small amount of capital versus the 
unweighted balance sheet.   
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(b) Recommendations for further research 
Having assessed the above findings and their possible explanations this study will conclude 
that the current Basel III banking standards have loopholes and if not rectified, the current 
problems will perpetuate into the future, like her predecessors. Based on the above 
conclusion, this study would like to make the following recommendations to be included in 
the following Basel IV banking standards, now that the current Basel III standards are 
flawed: 
 Basel authorities need to consult widely from all banking jurisdictions of the globe, 
so that the standards will adequately capture different characteristics and 
regulations of an average bank in the world. Currently the standards are perceived 
as skewed in favour of the West and not in favour of the world.  
  There is need to identify the type of assets to be considered when dealing with bank 
risks. It has been apparent throughout this investigation that categorization on asset 
quality has been a major problem in capturing quality data for banks in SACU. The 
impact of asset quality and value need to be studied because changes in asset quality 
and value can wipe out bank capital. For example, if short term liabilities are used to 
fund longer term assets, and should there be a failure to roll over short term 
financial paper or a deposit run occurs, banks will de-leverage and asset sales will 
result as the bank desperately source for funding to meet long term liabilities. This 
will negatively impact on bank capital within SACU. 
 The capital levels for an average bank need to be investigated because right now        
different capital levels are being used across SACU. If Basel III standards are to be 
effective, it should be possible to come up with common capital levels that will allow 
smooth trading and comparison to occur around the world. 
 Unsecured lending has recently been practiced within SACU and led to downgrading 
of South Africa’s four major banks by Moody’s Ratings Agency.  There is need to re-
look into the laws of the role of the central bank, especially what and how to 
supervise on lending by banks. 
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   The corollary is for researchers’ in monetary economics to be wary of the structure of the 
leverage ratio when interpreting financial results of banking institutions. In other words, 
can short term numerator values used to make long term investment decisions? This study 
concurs with previous researchers that the leverage ratio is improperly calibrated and 
there is need to come up with a correct calibration of it. 
     High debt to GDP ratio makes it difficult for a country to pay its debt and causes it to 
default, causing a panic in the domestic and international markets. Monetary economists 
should help their governments strive to have low debt to GDP ratios. It is debt to GDP that 
measures the financial leverage of an economy. A low debt to GDP ratio indicates an 
economy that produces and sells goods and services sufficient to pay back debts without 
incurring further debt. 
      A country can achieve external debt sustainability if it can meet its present and future 
external debt service obligations in full, without resorting to debt rescheduling or the 
accumulation of arrears and without compromising growth. This is achievable if net 
present value of external debt is brought down below values of exports. Given the volatility 
of GDP during business cycles, this study would recommend for the adoption of the formula 
based method for addressing cyclicality, rather than the discretionary based method. This 
is because debt and credit levels need to be ascertained and quantified and matched with 
GDP.  
     This study is significant in that it is based on SACU. It attempts to test the authenticity of 
the assertion that the new Basel III banking standards are not relevant to other parts of the 
world, including SACU. In SACU, the leverage ratio was significant, especially when 
supplemented by other monetary measures. Economies of SACU have managed to weather 
effects of the business cycles through use of supplementary monetary measures to the 
leverage ratio. It has also been found that some banks are sceptical on the use of the 
liquidity requirements, because they do not know the right formula and the variables to 
use when compiling data for assessment of the leverage ratio and minimum capital 
adequacy requirements; hence this is rendering the credibility of the latest Basel III 
standards negatively. What is needed now and going forward is to come up with the right 
method for calibrating the leverage ratio and minimum capital levels.    
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    This study concludes that the latest banking standards can be improved for the banking 
industry of SACU and other parts of the globe, to reflect on the realities of their economies.  
What is necessary for the future is for the monetary authorities of any given country to 
tailor make their own local settings to be in line with the current banking standards, and to 
enable comparisons to be made internationally. Other areas for further research include:  
category of assets that banks need to consider in order to have a globally acceptable 
leverage ratio. The numerator of the leverage ratio should not constitute short term 
liabilities; rather it should be in line with investor’s interest.  Furthermore, the current level 
of 3 per cent for the leverage ratio needs review, since it is viewed as too low. 
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APPENDIX  
Table  A1 Results of the OLS estimates for South African banks assets.  
Dependent Variable: Assets 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability   
**L/R 49132.43 9585.172 5.125878 0.0000 
C -2184.889 108679.5 -0.020104 0.9840 
R-squared 0.327309   
Adjusted R-squared 0.314852 
Prob(F-stat) 0.00004 
S.E. of regression 187175.0 
DW    0.241995 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
* Where L / R and assets are statistically independent, the correlation coefficient between them will be zero; however, 
 Zero correlation does not imply independence.   
*α=righttailarea0.05,df=55,thet-valueis2.0. 
** L / R = Leverage ratio 
 
Table A2 Results of the OLS estimates for Namibian bank assets 
Dependent Variable: Assets 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability   
**L/R -264690.7 9585.172 5.125878 0.5275 
C 105388389 108679.5 -0.020104 0.0085 
R-squared 0.010057  
Adjusted R-squared -0.014692 
Prob(F-stat) 0.527458 
S.E. of regression 6102970 
DW    0.230991 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
* Where L / R and assets are statistically independent, the correlation coefficient between them will be zero; however, 
 Zero correlation does not imply independence.   
*α=righttailarea0.05,df=55,thet-valueis2.0. 
** L / R = Leverage ratio 
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Table A3 Results of the OLS estimates for Botswana banks assets  
Dependent Variable: Assets 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability   
**L/R 802161.0 333020.8 2.408741 0.0207 
C -511095.0 3404666 -0.150116 0.8814 
R-squared 0.126676  
 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.104843 
Prob(F-stat) 0.020705 
S.E of regression 4603763 
DW 0.197085 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
* Where L / R and assets are statistically independent, the correlation coefficient between them will be zero; however, 
 Zero correlation does not imply independence.   
*α=righttailarea0.05,df=55,thet-valueis2.0. 
** L / R = Leverage ratio 
 
Table A4 Results of the OLS estimates for Swaziland banks assets   
 Dependent Variable: Assets     
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability   
**L/R 826884.71 333020.8 2.408741 0.0000 
C -238869.0 3404666 -0.150116 0.0146 
R-squared 0.667000  
 
 
 
 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.658675 
Prob(F-stat) 0.000000 
S.E of regression 6.17E+11 
DW 0.248902 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
* Where L / R and assets are statistically independent, the correlation coefficient between them will be zero; however, 
 Zero correlation does not imply independence.   
*α=righttailarea0.05,df=55,thet-valueis2.0. 
** L / R = Leverage ratio 
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Table A5 Results of the OLS estimates for Lesotho banks assets  
Dependent Variable: Assets 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic Probability  
 
 
 
**L/R 137158.5 16820.03 8.154472 0.0000 
C -578602.2 155268.6 -3.726461 0.0006 
R-squared 0.624397  
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.615007 
Prob(F-stat) 0.000000   
S.E of regression 238090.9 
DW 0.497759 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
* Where L / R and assets are statistically independent, the correlation coefficient between them will be zero; however, 
 Zero correlation does not imply independence.   
*α=righttailarea0.05,df=55,thet-valueis2.0. 
** L / R = Leverage ratio 
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Table A6 ANOVA results of the debt and credit for South Africa (2000-2013). 
Dependent Variable GDP       
Method           Df          value      Probability  
 
 
 
 
Anova F-test        (3.220)        7.656725      0.0001 
Welsh F-test*      (3.106.536)        113.6599      0.0000 
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
e.g. ‘’Analysis of variance’’ 
Source of variation               Df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between  
Within 
              3 
            220 
1.84E+19 
1.76E+20 
6.12E+18 
8.00E+17 
Total             223 1.94E+20 8.71E+17 
‘’Category Statistics’’ 
Variable Count Mean Std.Dev.  Std Err of Mean 
GDP        56 1357008 360574.5 48183.79 
DEBT-INSRUMENT        56 211837.7 618339.1 82629.03  
 
CREDIT DEBT-
CREDIT 
       56  
       56 
388700.7 
6.62E+08 
1881104.4 
1.79E+09 
25137.31 
2.39E+08 
ALL       224 1.66E+08 9.33E+08 62367092 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
 *Data and example calculations for a two- way ANOVA design to examine main and interactive effects of debt and credit .*Each cell 
is a combination of factor levels i and j , and contains r=2 observations or replications. 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; DEBT-INSTR=Debt Instrument 
BANKS: (FNB; STANDARD BANK ABSA AND NEDBANK) 
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Table A7 ANOVA results of the debt and credit for Namibia (2000-2013). 
 Dependent variable GDP         
Method           Df          value      Probability  
 
 
Anova F-test        (3.164)        134.7793      0.0000 
Welsh F-test
*
      (3.68.3333)        114.6714      0.0000 
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
e.g. ‘’Analysis of variance’’ 
Source of variation               Df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between  
Within 
              3 
            164 
1.32E+15 
5.36E+14 
4.40E+14 
3.27E+12 
Total             167 1.86E+15  
‘’Category Statistics’’  
 
 
Variable Count Mean Std.Dev.  Std Err of Mean 
GDP        42 39726.36 18174.27 2804.350 
DEBT-
INSRUMENT 
       42 135591.8 251107.3 38746.70 
CREDIT DEBT-
CREDIT 
       42  
       42 
6532371 
4.291029 
3605721 
2.501668 
556374.8 
0.386016 
ALL       168 1676923 3333982 257222.3 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
 *Data and example calculations for a two- way ANOVA design to examine main and interactive effects of debt and credit .*Each cell 
is a combination of factor levels i and j , and contains r=2 observations or replications. 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; DEBT-INSTR=Debt Instrument 
BANKS: (FNB; STANDARD BANK ABSA AND NEDBANK) 
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Table A8 ANOVA results of the debt and credit for Botswana (2000-2013). 
Dependent Variable GDP     
Method           Df          value      Probability  
 
 
 
 
Anova F-test        (3.164)        169.8674      0.0000 
Welsh F-test
*
      (3.68.3333)        90.44979      0.0000 
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
e.g. ‘’Analysis of variance’’ 
Source of variation               Df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between  
Within 
              3 
            164 
4.46E+21 
1.43E+21 
1.49E+21 
8.75E+18 
Total             167 5.89E+21 3.53E+19 
‘’Category Statistics’’ 
Variable Count Mean Std.Dev.  Std Err of Mean 
GDP        42 1.19E+10 5.92E+09 9.13E+08 
DEBT-
INSRUMENT 
       42 266846.3 228768.3 35299.72 
CREDIT DEBT-
CREDIT 
       42  
       42 
2472655 
3.798908 
2275184 
2.598374 
351068.5 
0.400938 
ALL       168 2.97E+09 5.94E+09 4.58E+08 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
 *Data and example calculations for a two- way ANOVA design to examine main and interactive effects of debt and credit .*Each cell 
is a combination of factor levels i and j , and contains r=2 observations or replications. 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; DEBT-INSTR=Debt Instrument 
BANKS: (FNB; STANBIC BANK AND BARCLAYS). 
 
Table A9 ANOVA results of the debt and credit for Lesotho (2000-2013). 
Dependent Variable GDP 
Method           Df          value      Probability  
 
 
Anova F-test        (3.164)        19.78853      0.0000 
Welsh F-test
*
      (3,68.3333)        98.57270       0.0000 
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
e.g. ‘’Analysis of variance’’ 
Source of variation               Df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between  
Within 
              3 
            164 
5.01E+22 
1.38E+23 
1.67E+22 
8.43E+20 
Total             167 1.88E+23 1.13E+21  
‘’Category Statistics’’  
Variable Count Mean Std.Dev.  Std Err of Mean  
 GDP        42 7841.998 2606.372 402.1720 
DEBT-
INSRUMENT 
       42 68613.52 76557.72 11813.11 
DEBT-INSRUMENT        42 68613.52 76557.72 11813.11  
 CREDIT DEBT-
CREDIT 
       42  
       42 
515875.6 
3.99E+10 
206030.2 
5.81E+10 
31791.14 
8.96E+09 
ALL       168 9.97E+09 9.97E+09 2.59E+09 
ANALYSIS: By author 
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 *Data and example calculations for a two- way ANOVA design to examine main and interactive effects of debt and credit .*Each cell 
is a combination of factor levels i and j , and contains r=2 observations or replications. 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; DEBT-INSTR=Debt Instrument;  
BANKS: (FNB; STANDARD BANK AND ABSA) 
 
Table A10 ANOVA results of the debt and credit for Swaziland (2000-2013). 
 Dependent Variable GDP        
Method           Df          value      Probability 
Anova F-test        (3.164)        38.13599      0.0000  
Welsh F-test
*
      (3,77.1034)       2811.223       0.0000  
 
 
*Test allows for unequal cell variances 
e.g. ‘‘Analysis of variance’’ 
Source of variation               Df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between  
Within 
              3 
            164 
2.26E+20 
3.24E+20 
 
Total             167 5.49E+20 3.29E+18  
 
 
 ‘’Category Statistics’’ 
Variable Count Mean Std.Dev.  Std Err of Mean 
GDP        42 12167006 848537.1 130932.1 
DEBT-
INSRUMENT 
       42 39895.31 60319.20 9307.454 
CREDIT DEBT-
CREDIT 
       42  
       42 
148822.8 
2.68E+09 
115722.2 
2.81E+09 
17856.33 
4.33E+08 
ALL       168 6.73E+08 1.81E+09 1.40E+08 
 
ANALYSIS: By author 
 
 *Data and example calculations for a two- way ANOVA designed to examine the main and interactive effects of debt and 
credit.*Each cell is a combination of factor levels i and j , and contains r=2 observations or replications. 
GDP= Gross Domestic Product; DEBT-INSTR=Debt Instrument  
BANKS: (FNB; STANDARD BANK AND ABSA)     
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